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Abstract 
This paper makes the case that democracy can reduce poverty. The exigency for such a 
discourse derives from the discrepancy of the causal direction of the relationship between 
democracy and development. Building on theoretical underpinnings introduced by Amartya Sen 
and the empirical demonstration by Morton Halperin et al. in The Democracy Advantage, this 
paper argues that the dispersed power within democracy contributes to the satisfaction of 
citizens' basic physiological needs. This conjecture is systematically and empirically tested over 
a six-year period using ten developing countries in Africa. 
The data reveals that higher levels of democracy correspond to subsequent increases in basic 
needs satisfaction-reductions in poverty-especially at low levels of wealth. These findings 
confirm Halperin et al.'s assertion that democracy holds an advantage over authoritarianism by 
improving social welfare in developing countries. Furthermore, the results of this study detail 
how dispersing power within government and between government and society allows for 
development through innovation, experimentation and incremental change. These conclusions 
offer great promise for foreign aid distributors because they suggest democracy and economic 
development need not be viewed as competing priorities in developing countries. Democracy 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I. Problem 
In the latter half of the 20th century, American foreign policy promoted development as a 
predecessor to democracy. The United States supported dictators in hopes that economic growth 
would eventually bring conditions for sustainable liberal democratic development. The 
intellectual basis for these policies has been rooted in the theory of modernization, which touts 
development as a necessary precursor to democracy. 
Seymour Lipset was the first to examine the correlation between democracy and development, 
claiming that well-to-do nations are more likely than poor countries to be democracies. l Adam 
Przeworski built a broad-based empirical case that more developed countries offer greater 
promise for democratic sustainability? Ronald Inglehart outlined a human development 
sequence moving from basic economic development to value changes emphasizing self-
determination and resulting in institutionalized democracy. 3 For modernization theorists, 
development must precede democracy. 
More recently, scholars have begun to reverse the causal arrow: that democracy contributes to 
development. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen argued for the intrinsic, protective and constructive 
importance of freedom for development. 4 Empirical research, however, is varied on this 
question. Przeworski' s work, covering the period from 1950 to 1990, contends there is no 
significant difference in total economic growth between democracies and autocracies. 
When Morton Halperin et al. slightly redefined the concepts of democracy and development, 
they found that a higher level of democracy corresponded with higher levels of quality of 
life.5Halperin et al. argued and demonstrated that higher quality democracies were more likely to 
improve quality of life for citizens.6 However they only speculated about the underlying causes, 
focusing on the concepts of shared power, openness and adaptability. I will attempt to 
investigate the positive correlation Halperin et al. found between the overall quality of 
democracy and the quality of life by unpacking democracy into a range of constituent 
dimensions in order to test Halperin et ai's proposed causes. I will reframe democracy as 
dispersed power, arguing that this allows innovation, experimentation, and incremental change, 
which are at the core of Halperin's et al. theoretical argument. I will use measures of basic needs 
satisfaction (food, water and healthcare )to represent quality of life. And then I will empirically 
test the relationship between basic needs satisfaction and dispersed power by examining ten 
African countries 7 from 1998 to 2004. 
This statistical test is designed to answer my basic research question: Do higher levels of 
dispersed power within governments and between government and society improve subsequent 
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II. Significance of Study 
Isolating the key causal mechanism between democracy and development has theoretical and 
practical implications. Theoretically, this study could provide empirical evidence that dispersed 
power is responsible for the advantage democracy provides for development. On the other hand, 
the absence of a relationship would bring into question Halperin et al.' s speculations about the 
underlying causes behind a democracy advantage and leave us wondering precisely what it is 
about democracy that leads to development. 
Practically, establishing a link between dispersed power and basic needs satisfaction would 
encourage aid distributors to support mechanisms that disperse power as a way to enhance both 
democracy and quality of life. Establishing a causal relationship would also cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of government strategies that aim to centralize power in an effort to better 
coordinate service delivery. Such an approach, for example, is evident in South Africa as the 
ruling party, the African National Congress, seeks to reduce the power of provinces in an effort 
to centralize delivery of services. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence that dispersed power is advantageous for improving satisfaction 
of basic needs will raise serious concerns about 'grand strategies' proposed by policy makers and 
international financial institutions that claim to spur economic development and reduce poverty. 
Such results would reduce the credibility of universal development prescriptions, like the 
'Washington Consensus.' Ultimately, this study would support the claim that incremental 
development strategies are preferable to centralized elite-plans implemented from 'above.' 
Yet regardless of the results of this study, further research will be necessary to test the 
relationship between democracy and development using different measures of democracy in 
various settings over diverse periods of time. 
III. State of Knowledge 
The causal direction of the relationship between democracy and development remains unclear. 
Modernization theorists argue that development is required for democracy. Other scholars argue 
that democracy is advantageous for development. While theories exist to support both 
viewpoints, the increasing quality and quantity of available data enables scholars to empirically 
test their theories beyond foreign policy trial and error. 
Seymour Lipset was the first to demonstrate a correlation between democracy and development. 
Lipset categorized countries as "more or less democratic," and considered whether a country had 
an uninterrupted political democracy since World War I and an absence of mass political 
movements in the last twenty-five years opposed to democracy.8 Lipset's indices of economic 
development included wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education. He conducted a 
cross-sectional analysis of countries in European and English Speaking Nations and Latin 
American Nations using data available from various years during the 1950s. Although Lipset 
concluded that economic development increases the chances for sustainable democracy, one 
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In the 1960s modernization theory came to the forefront of American foreign policy. The 
Alliance for Progress, introduced by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, aimed to establish 
economic cooperation between North and South America with eventual goals of political 
freedom. One of the most prominent political economists behind the formation and 
implementation of this policy was Walt Rostow, who championed a 'take-off' model of 
economic growth.9 Throughout the rest of the 20 th century, American foreign policy was 
predominantly driven by similar views that economic development facilitates political freedom 
and democracy. 
Adam Przeworski and his colleagues established an empirical connection between democracy 
and development by analyzing all countries between 1950 and 1990. Przeworski categorized 
countries as either democracies or autocracies, defining a democracy as a country that has 
peacefully turned over ruling power at least once; his operational definition of development was 
GDP per capita. He determined that the timing of democratic transitions could not be predicted 
by a country's GDP per capita, but a country is almost guaranteed to remain democratic above a 
certain level of GDP per capita, approximately US$4000. IO In short, his research finds that 
development is not an instigating factor for democracy, but contributes heavily to democratic 
sustainability. Finally, Przeworski determined there was no significant difference between total 
economic growth of dictatorships and democracies, although GDP per capita is higher in 
democracies due to higher population growth in autocracies. I I Thus he finds no democracy 
advantage for development. 
Ronald Inglehart has recently attempted to clarify, within modernization theory, the causal 
relationship between development and democracy. His human development sequence describes 
the process of broadening freedom, or human choice, in three steps, which he supports largely 
through survey data. 12 Socioeconomic modernization enables a departure from a mere survival 
mentality and increases the material, cognitive, and social capabilities for human choice. Then 
cultural values change to support self-determination. Democracy provides best the institutional 
framework to protect and maximize this growing capacity and priority for freedom of action. 
Thus Inglehart also argues that some degree of development must precede democracy. 
At the turn of the century, however, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen turned modernization theory 
on its head by contending that the underlying freedom of choice within democracy is 
advantageous for development. 13 He describes democracy's "intrinsic relevance" to 
development from values such as expression and association. Democracy also serves a 
"protective role" for development by preventing famines and other disasters through increased 
flows of information. Finally, democracy has a "constructive importance" to development 
because it enables effective, open discussions to formulate competent policy. In sum, democracy 
contributes to development. 
In 2005 Morton Halperin et al. substantiated Sen's theory with empirical evidence. In The 
Democracy Advantage, Halperin et ai. contend that higher quality democracies breed 
development, which they understand as higher quality of life, or social welfare for citizens. 14 
The book has created a stir among foreign policy makers in Washington, as it uses credible data 
to refute modernization theory. Halperin et al. reverse the causal arrow from democracy to 
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The use of new and updated data greatly facilitated Halperin et al. 's nuanced analysis. Contrary 
to Przeworski, Halperin et al. do not use a threshold operationalization to di vide countries into 
democracies or autocracies. Instead, Halperin et ai. use Polity ratings and freedom scores to 
create a continuum of democracy although their concept of democracy remains uni-dimensional, 
like Przeworski. 15 Halperin et al.' s operational definition of development also goes beyond GDP 
to assess the ability of a country to meet people's basic needs, using social welfare indicators like 
life expectancy, school enrollment and death rates. 16 At the time of the analysis data was 
available through 2003, enabling Halperin et al. to assess more than a decade of post-Cold War 
experience not considered in Przeworski's work. 
Halperin et aI.' s research demonstrates that "citizens of democracies live longer, healthier, and 
more productive lives, on average, than those in autocracies.,,17 More over, he finds that the 
higher the quality of a democracy, the greater the country's ability to improve quality of life by 
meeting citizens' basic needs. 
Moving beyond their empirical data, however, Halperin et al. speculate about the dynamics that 
give rise to the empirical observations. They reason that shared power, openness and 
adaptability facilitate innovation, experimentation and incremental change. These traits enable 
democracies to improve quality of life better than autocracies, and more democratic countries 
better than less democratic countries. They then make some limited attempts to empirically test 
their proposed reasons, by comparing levels of accountability within democracies and 
autocracies, but do not thoroughly test these speculations. 
In sum, a strong relationship is evident between democracy and development, but there is little 
consensus among scholars about the causality of the relationship or the dynamics that underlie 
the observed association. Thus building on Halperin et al.' s empirical work, I intend to test their 
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I. Ar~umetll 
\1)" argumen l re,t, on as,umption, ahout certain commonali!ie, among all human beings. 
l; nd~rpinning the tocoldic.llthru,t of thi, Jrgument is tfre a"umplion that all hllman beings 
dC\l!"C trcedolll mill sclf·dctcnnination. Only ln a demo;.:ralic socicly with gUJranteed basic 
human rights can mdi' illuals !"Calia thci r nea1l , .. e polential. frectlolll allows indi vidllals to 
promulgate thcir idcas, and tlispcrsctl pov.er inhib!t~ OIocr individuals from taking credit for 
ideas lhat are nOllheiro",". Thll'. a free and dcmocrati c s()Cietj' provide~ an environm..nt 
cOllducl ve lo advanci ng new idea, necau,e indivIdual s are r~" arded for Ihei r credti ,,·ity. 
llow~ver. "'hi Ie hllmJn helllg' Jre re'ourcef ul Jnd i I1du"110US, they are imperf ecl. '"'01 ail Idea., 
arC good onC,. When an individual 1"';"""" 11l1fe"r~ined p<",-er. he or she nn enact pohcics 0.-
itlcas wIthout c'on,ulling (>lhcr,_ \Vhcthcr thc pur<uil is wcll or til intcnti<Hletl. lt can have eqllally 
poor n:sults, ConscqllC"tly, power must be disperscd to prevcnt a small minol"ity from making 
quick, hroad chJnges within a ,ociet)', Thl" democratic "Kieties can e, l>eriment wnh di ffcrem 
idea" halting hilil ones and pu"uing the h",t idea, hJ>ed ~olely on menl and experience. 
Promoting the free· flow of ideas and preempli ng I'lCgati ve repercllssions of bJd ideas allov.; 
Incremental change_ Countrie, can develop policies and take action' lhat are he" sUIted to tllei, 
spcdtic situations , AltllOugh all people prefer freedom and economic' prosperity. tile meanS to 
the>e ends Me nO( lIni versal. Thcre are no . onc-si1.c-lits-all' dcmocralic pnllllO(ion or eC'-Hl.)mic 
development ~trategi"'_ Dl>pe"ing power within gm'el'llment Jnd belw~en government and 
M>C1ClY ailow, nCw idea" hal" bod one, and eventually hring' ahoul increTTlCmal change 
l I. lI~potheses 
Usingtlata on len African countries hC'("cen 199~ and 2004_1 expect to find tlMt 
1_ Citi7ens of COlllltnes with higher level- of democracy in I (J<J)( enjoyed g r~ater 
impr'" emenl sin dc..e lopmenl ~Iw~elll ()')~ and 2004 Ihan tho", Ii ving in cOllnlrie, 
WIth lowcr levch of delllc":nlcy_ 
2. Citizens of countrie, v.ho,e levels dcmrx'racy Increascd betwcen 1998 .md 2004 
experienced a greater impro\'emen( in dc\'clopment dutlng thc same period thJn (hose 
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III. Key Concept<. 
llnl'lopnwut HS Bask ;\''1'rh Salhfaction 
lk.dopm ... nL i, mulli -fa,.;de<.! ant! t!i ven,el y unriersluud. I I"e P' y~hu l o~"l Ahraham Mas low , 
hicrar~h y of nccu, a.S a guit!c to Uc"ciol'menL fhe fiThL ,leI' (~l lhi, pyramiu of human Ilecul 
llld u,ks physiological nceus. likc foot! anu waler (Figu re 1'- I i 
;\Itholl gh I here m~ man} "'l>~~'l ""nt ~olll]Jonenh of hllm~n d~" ... l opm~nt. ha,je- need.' mu,L l'" 
,aIlS fic'u before any others. Whi Ic phras.et! positi vcl y ,n tlus analysis a' basic nccds sm i sfacti (C(I 
(BNS), this cic\elopmcnt can also l>e re:leneci (0 a, lX'ven.y r~cillction. 
\bny inui~e, ~ Il ... mpllo mea.,ure p",....-Iy, bU I TTlOS( uo ,0 lIluir<x(I). Tmuilional cconomic 
inuicators mcasure anlc~ecicnt calhC" whe(hcr in re,ource,. a.,se(, 0'- capal>ilitie,. Other 
meHSI1'-~S IIS~ conse'luenc~s. ,u~h~, longevity, health or h~l'l'in ... ". The Afrohanm", ler, 
however. di'-ectly m~,'-'UI'" 'lived [X"erl/ by a,king responuenl, huw oftell (hey Junc 'gonc 
withuut' ba.,i~ ne~~."ili~., . " 
Ewnomi sts may ,Ii S,lpp,,:)ve of thi S 'UPIXl,e,Uy k" ol>j~<,ti v ... str~l egy, hut the A frobaromder '.' 
techni'lll~ ha, (he aJvan(~ge ot heing ~n ah,olute ,<'al ~ lha( inherelllly ~()nsiuers (he contCX(: it 
du", not need I 0 he wnle,lu"lil.et! lu cOst of Ii. "lg likc ,nwmc s(atis(ics. It s ystematicHlly 
measures Lhe "0-\ pericn~c" juJ gment, an d pfete"'nc~s of ~ r~pr~,en tmi"~ s~mrl~ of p"0ple. "):) 
Th~ A f'-ohal'()met~ r '"rvey ~sb rc'ponrient, ~rnlUL f uud_ waler ~nt! heallll<;arc. It is jl<lssiblc to 
a~gn,g"te lhe,e inJi~awr' as a ~ollllX'site inM:\ boclIl sc "th~ 111')[10 I>copl~ ~\peli~n~e ,honafes 
o~ any OIlC ilulin,lor. [be 1ll0fe likdy tlley ~re to tace , Il<m~ge, ()nLh~ oth~r'."" The ,>uney al,o 
find' (hHi people cOOCell(lIHlj/c >hon~g~., in t ile .'~l1le way wlwLh ... r Lhcy <-,,\pcricn~e lX'\'c rL~ 
reftLbrly or rardy. 
Changc, in thc strul'[llre of the A t rol:>al'()l1"'t~r sc~k m~rit' ~ddi(i()nal ~ttenl i OIl I-let,,~~n (h" 
tiC't an,1 second rount!s ot w,-,,~)'s, (he ",~l~ w~, e~panued from an oruinal sc'alc 01'1'0111 to tI\C 
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pmnts, Tn., only dir~ctly corr",pondin~ re'pon,e "ale~ory remained !!ever ' gore withou!' 1<><><1. 
waler or heallhcare. 
Ho",e\,cr. I wam to frame tlndopment m a poluive rathcrthan :Illcgativc way. Thus I com-eli 
the relpomes 10 lh" Afrooarometcr survcy questions into a measuretnem of basic ""etl, 
sali,fadion (B ~S) hy U,l ng lhe percentage of r"sp<:'ndems who say thcy Hera went ",i lho"l 
food. water and heallhcarc in the prev iom' twelve mnnths. These components may lheorelicall y 
comprise an index OCCIUSC they ,hare commonalitie' a, phy,iolo~i('al needs lhat m",t be present 
to progee" funher on ",lasl ow', hierarchy of n eetl,. 
Con"~ptu alizi n g J)emocracy as J)i'p"",,,d Power 
l1lC first step 111 any empirical study of dcmocracy is to ddermine what will hie ('onsidered a 
democmc>'. The literature on deroocratic tn.,ory i, tleep antl wide, hut sOTre ('OmmOn 
re'luiremem, for democracy uSWllly itlciuu" "universal, adult luffrage: recurring, frec. 
competitive. and fair elections: more than onc serious pohtical patty: and :ilte'-Ihltiv~ ,ource, of 
inform:lti (m."" Howcver, oper:ltionalizing thi, into a c:llegorizalion of real countries is a 
recum n ~ challenge. 
Researchers may choo", to analyzc only countries tha! :Ire nomin:llly dero('ICratic, but I will mak" 
no such distinction, ' ,1 Zachary Elkim shows th:1t "looking for !races of democracy in ,eemmgl y 
'nondemocratic ' regimes makes g(~lJ It.emelic~1 ~nd TrethoJolo~i('al..en..e,"u This LnciusiVl' 
approach allows ohservati on of Jemo<Tal ic tentlencies In apparently auto<:ratic count ries and 
utidcmocratic tcntlencies 111 ",pposedly democratic countries, 
1'0 determine a democracy one must Ike'ide whether 10 "Ie a thre,hold. a ('ontin""m or both, 
Przeworsie; U,eS a threshold, di vidin~ countrie, mlO either tle mocra(';cs or autocra,Lcs. Ho" cYer. 
to account for , 'ariancc among democraCIes and to reducc the ch:IlKe, of miscate~ori fation. 
Halperin el a/. a,sesscs democracy on a graJatlon, or comi nuum. I will rate democracy On a 
contlIluum. ref" rrin~ to it a, the extent of uemocra('y 
\\11en inve,ti gating a democra<y, one mw;t also occide "hether to conSlJer it In patts or as <l 
whole. In contra,t to analyses like Przcwor,kj :md Halper1l1 el al. lhat consider entire polili~s. 
Lac,)' Diamond :IllJ Leonardo .\-\o{litlO ,uggesj measurin~ mulliple component, of democracy, ]1 
In ord~r to o"serve nuances "ithin a counlry', ~ovemance, I wi II use mC asures of multiple 
di ml'll,ions of tlemr><:racy to aSle,S the overall e,\ tent of demo<:racy. 
To pi npoim the underl yi ng d ynaml<'s of democr:lcy that contribute to innovation, 
experi mentation and incremental change. J will cxpand I Jalperin rl al. " discu"ion of '>ha,-eJ 
power to dispa,rd pVl1'er. This COll(l'jlt etl(ompass"s a "ariety of pow"r rel:1I i on ,hi p' I hat are 
nol mutually e~clusive, but broadly ioclu<le' limiled. separaletl :Inu shared p<lWeL I'heorie, of 
tlemocrac)' I hal emphasizc the impon;Ul(e of the", ideas dme bac \; to la,,,,,, M~di son anu I he 
Federalist Pa~>crs, .\--Iadison Je>crihc, how thc bmilal;OI! of power helps "to guard thc society 
ag"in' t {he oppre"inn OfllS I1Ilcr, land lto gU:lrd one pan oftn., 'ociety again"lhe inju,'ice ot 
the other pan"' S~paY(11ed power "noole, "I he U'U'1'allon, [to bel guarded agaiml by a tli vi sion 
of the gowrnmenl into distincl and separdte parb." Shm'ed power connotes a SOCicl y "hrolcn 









inlO '" m"IlY paltS, Llltl'r~s.ts, "l1d cla,s~s d citizL' ll s. that th~ righi' of indl ,idLE'II" <'r of Ihl' 
I1li n"rity, wi II O~ i tl Ii uk d,]jlg~1 b'lll i 1llL'IT>ll'd cnmbi 11 ~tiotl S d th~ maj orily ,.:" 
Ho" ~ ,eL. 1:1~~ause mdic'"IH'<1;, "f li m; le<L separ"ld all d shared ppw~r arL' do,,'1 y rdaled, II 
w0Uld nOI h~ w,,! 11m hile LO USe e~ch ('~l~,:ory as a dis"rew olnn"pl 10 m~asure th~ ~"I.~nlof 
d~m0Crac y. I l1s(~aJ I wi 11 us;: Di .1I110l1d .1tl d \iC'<,lil1o' S C'~lC~ptS of ruk of IJw, ci vi I atld poli t iCJ I 
fr~~ooms. parlicipmi0n. compL'liliC'11 alld acco untahility In d~"crik (h~ multipk dim~tl,i'~l' ,{ 
dis>~r,~d ])Ow~r.'" 
I he f"llo" i ng dl ~,:r al1l IF; gUTe 2) repreS<:l11s th~ Clll1<:~ptuali ?.:itiOll of di 'peTsed p<'w~r 'bill g 
I)i ~l1l''<1d ~11 d "1m lill0'" di "",n"joll' or d~l1lo<:raLy Th~re 1 S SOl1l~ l11l.~rr~btedn~" he l Weell lh~ 
d,=nsions of d~rn<xracy: bliithis diagram r~pl'~SL'nIS thl' illl~rs~Clions of limiled. '~p",wl'd alld 
,hJr~d powa Whik ~,Kh diITl<' l"i nll may 11"1 "Iway, fit n~" lly int"" ~ilher hnlll~,L \ep~f~l~d"r 
,hard POW,'1'. Ih~y"" help iO defin ~ dis~r,~d p<'W~L 
PartlC;patian 
Rule af Law Ac-eXl<mtab,ly 
ThL' rll l ~ of ]a w Can limi t lh~ am''lltll of pnw~r all" ;11 di vid u;] I call ex erL "i I h,..,1 r~p"rcll"j0<lS_ 
on anolkr ]Xl'SOtl ''[ g'l1UP, f._qually dj"tnhulll1g pOI1l1"~1 ~nd cinl fr~l'Joms catl hdp 10 ,har~ 
pC''' ~r aillotl gSl J II p~rh of :;'X' i~[y, ~ll "1:1Ii",: ~"" I, ci Liz~l1 LO k in wh;:d in Ih~ dl'm:'Cratic 
pro<.'~" Widdy h:lsed parll~ip"li,'n ~an sh~l''' ])O"-L'I Jll1nllg'I"1I cilinn, Ihwugh ~ 1 ~c!i,'nS: II 
can abolimil th~ p<)w~r nfl'fflei,.I" hy L"illg the \'m~ 1<' renK"~ thL'm from C'ffICe. Cnmpditioll 
can ~I1SU'-~ lh~t )),'''er i, ;,hm~d kl\\~"n group', which are likL'ly 10 cC'ntrihut~ ll'" ,-~"I 
'~rJnti "11 "f IX'''~' ""11,, n I he go""rnm~I\L Elledi \'l' accou Ilobilil y ca 11 COtl In OUIl' t" '~P"T"I<XI 
P<'''~T h~lween political LJlstilUli0<ls and il c~n alsn hdp \'nter' I;mitlh~ P<)"~'- pI' go\WnmeJlI 
Aclnllildly. Ihe'L' di'I Lnc~on s ar~ impr;:cisl' C{)nc~pt ually, lh~) ar ~ lo,,,el) lillked ~nd 1! wi]; I", 
Idllo ~mplrical aJl ~I~,i s \0 d~t~rmiIlL' if Ih ~s( dinlL'Il';OIl' ,hould ht' coll,idered WI!hiJl0<ll' 
0, ~ rarchLng cnJlCL'I't of di sl)C r s~d pow~r. m ", '~p~rate di l1len,jons 











Dimensions of Democracy: Definitions and Measures 
a. Rule of Law 
While the rule of law is a necessary foundation for democracy. it is difficult to define. David 
Beetham describes the rule of law as "the foundation of any civilized existence, let alone 
democratic government.,,2X Guillermo O'Donnell insists that law must be written, sanctioned 
following set procedures. publicly promulgated before regulated events. and fairly applied across 
equi valent cases.2') In Got"ernwlce Matters IV World Bank researchers describe rule of law 
broadly as the extent to which "agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society." 30 
Thus beyond consistency and legitimacy, the intent and nature of the law are equally important 
to democracy. 
Beyond this, a democratic rule of law emphasizes the role of fairness. The rule of law within 
democracies should provide "fair and predictable rules [that] form the basis for economic and 
social interactions. and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected.,,3l The 
respect for universal human rights and dignity must be the base of fairness; a democratic society 
cannot create laws that discriminate or privilege the rights of certain citizens. A democratic rule 
of law should provide the guidelines and restrictions for a framework on which to build other 
democratic q uali ties. 
I will use the World Bank's measure of 'Control of Corruption' as the indicator of rule of law 
that is most likely to retlect dispersed power within a democratic society.'2 This Govemment 
Matters IV indicator measures the "lack of respect. .. for the rules which govern.":;' It serves as 
an indirect measure for the power balance within government. If there is less dispersed power, 
people can more easily engage in corrupt behavior. Shared and separated powers within a 
society enable people to prevent or hinder others' attempts to usurp power and resources for 
personal gain. While control of corruption is not necessarily indicati ve of disperse power, the 
presence of corruption clearly indicates a lack of dispersed power.'-' 
h. Civil and Political Freedoms and Equality 
Freedom is essential to democracy. Freedom and equality largely overlap with the literature on 
rule of law and are necessary prerequisites for other qualities of democracy. A constitution must 
guarantee rights and courts must protect them. Ci vii rights'5 are the main freedoms necessary to 
a democracy while political rights'O are relevant to specific democratic processes. These "rights 
[necessarily] entail equality" as they are intended to apply universally among people living 
. h' ,7 wIt In a country. 
In practice people do not necessarily enjoy the equality of political rights and civil liberties 
guaranteed by law. The procurement of civil and political equality is intertwined with 
socioeconomic equality. My argument considers political and civil rights as dimensions of 
democracy and thus components of the independent variable.3x 
Although socioeconomic inequalities may compound political power and intluence, civil and 
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the likelihood that the public is informed about government policies and actions. Greater civil 
and political freedoms enable people to take action. The extent to which the public realizes their 
freedoms and uses the information provided by free press will be considered in the next section. 
I will use Freedom House's freedom of press, civil liberties and political rights indicators to 
represent freedoms and equality. 
c. Participation 
A democracy must represent the interests of the people. In order for leaders to know the wishes 
of the people there must be public participation. Public participation is present in both civil and 
political processes. Entire studies are dedicated to examining public participation in ci vic 
society, which is extraordinarily important to building and nurturing democracy.-lO Civic 
participation is an indication of dispersed power within a society but is difficult to measure in 
national aggregated indices. It is interwoven throughout every aspect of society and varies in 
nature among countries. 
Although political and civic participation are interrelated, I will primarily consider political 
participation. The ratio of voters who turnout to registered voters in a national election provides 
a snapshot of political participation.-l 1 Elections enable each voter to share the power of deciding 
the political trajectory of the country. I will use the lFES Election Guide for turnout and 
. d d-l' reglstere voter ata.-
d. Competition 
Without competition public participation is futile. Voter turnout could be one hundred percent. 
but if there is only one choice, it means nothing. There must be substantial competition among 
opposing ideas in order to ascribe credibility to the idea or representative supported by the 
public. 
The link between competition and participation must move beyond elections. The Polity IV 
concept of 'Political Competition' attempts to measure "the extent to which the political system 
enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways." The researchers measure this 
concept "by the degree of institutionalization or 'regulation' of political participation, and by the 
extent of government restriction on political competition.,,-l3 Thus, I will use the 'Political 
Competition' indicator to provide a detailed view of the ongoing regulations and restrictions that 
affect participation and competition.-l-l 
e. Accountability 
Effective democracy relies on mutual responsibilities. These democratic responsibilities, known 
as accountability. include making formal or informal agreements between parties to keep the 
other informed. gi ving explanations for decisions, and accepting or recei ving predetermined 
sanctions for action or inaction.-loi Philippe Schmitter divides accountability into vertical and 
horizontal. The former applies to the relationship between citizens, representatives and rulers. 
The latter relates to the relationship between separate branches within the same government. 











on shared power between government and society. Horizontal accountability. on the other hand, 
generally does not directly involve the public but relies on limited and separated power within 
the government. 
The previously discussed qualities of democracy are strongly related to accountability. An 
effective rule of law creates accountability within a society by ensuring rulers and citizens must 
be judged equally against a set of rules. Civil and political rights and equality create the 
beginnings of vertical accountability by protecting individuals and increasing tlows of 
information to citizens. Competition and participation enable vertical accountability by creating 
an environment conducive to citizen action. These measures of dispersed power regarding action 
and information breed more accountable governance. 
In order to measure vertical accountability, I use Cm'emlllellt Matters lV's 'Voice and 
Accountability' indicator. which aggregates multiple datasets to determine the amount of power 
shared between the public and the government.-'o This indicator intends to capture "the process 
by which those in authority are selected and replaced.,,-'7 
I use two Polity IV indicators. 'Executive Constraints' and 'Executive Recruitment,' to measure 
horizontal acc~untability within government.-'x 'Executive Constraints.' is operationally defined 
as the "extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. 
whether individuals or collectivities."-"J Once in office. this measure retlects the limits to 
executi ve power. 
Such constraints are only effective if the possibility exists that the executive will be replaced. To 
fill this gap. Polity IV uses 'Executive Recruitment.' The concept combines "the extent of 
institutionalization of executive transfers. the competitiveness of executive selection. and the 
openness of executive recruitment" to represent the "structural characteristics by which chief 
executives are recruited.")O This measure alludes to the indirect limitations of executive power 
due to the increased possibility of replacement. 
The measure of 'Voice and Accountability' provides insight into the vertical accountability 
between government and society. The Polity IV measures retlect horizontal accountability 
within the government. Although these measures are all accountability. their conceptual 
differences may result in dissimilar variation. 
IV. A Summary of Variables and Indicators 
To restate. the key variables and measures are: 
Dependent Variable: Development 
Busic Needs SutisjilCtion: 
Afrobarometer respondents that have nel'er 'gone without' food. water 
'\ and healthcare 
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Extent of Democracy 
Freedom House "Political Rights''i' 
Freedom House "Civil Liberties,:i4 
Freedom House 'Freedom of the Press's:; 
lFES'i6 ratios of voter turnout to registered voters"! 
Polity IV "Political Competition,:iX 
Governunce Matters IV 'Voice and Accountability,:i') 
Politv IV 'Executive Recruitment,60 
Po/it:v IV "Executive Constraints,61 
This diagram represents the relationship between 
dimensions of democracy and the available 
indicators used to represent dispersed power. 
Rule of Law Control of Corruption 







Voice and Accountability 
Executive Recruitment and Constraints 
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Operational 
Dispersed Power 
The use of multiple databases. although diversifying the study. creates dissimilarities in times of 
measurement. Minimalizing differences in measurement times is of utmost importance to the 
integrity of the analysis. The Afrobarometer surveyed countries in three rounds with the first 
round in 1999 or 2000 and third round surveys in 2005. Variance across survey intervals 
presents irreconcilable inconsistencies that must be acknowledged. This accepted variance 
presents a choice of what year will be used as the initial measurement. 
Governance IV measures of "Control of Corruption' and "Voice and Accountability' are 
available every two years. limiting the choice of initial measurements to 1998 or 2000. Because 
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initial measure. Using measurements in 2000 would make initial democracy measures occur 
after some initial Afrobarometer surveys that provide data for the dependent variable of basic 
needs satisfaction. Furthermore. using 1998 as the initial time of measurement expands the time 
period in order to better assess longitudinal change. I chose 2004 as the final measurement for 
democracy because that was the most recent data available. 
The validity of the participation indicators is limited by the different timing of elections in each 
country. Two elections occurred in every country between 1998 and 2006. with first elections 
between 1998 and 2001 and final elections between 2002 and 2006. Freedom House and Po/it\' 
IV data provided yearly measurements, thus providing the greatest degree of flexibility. Across 
all variables the analysis uses measurements as near to 1998 and 2004 as possible in order to 
enhance reliability. transparency and systematic quality. 
V. Expectations 
I expect to find that greater dispersed power correlates with improvements in basic needs 
satisfaction, independent from the effects of 'third' variables. I expect that the components of 
dispersed power will relate because they intersect conceptually. The study may also show if any 
one dimension of dispersed power is more advantageous to improving basic needs satisfaction. 
Dispersed Power 
VI Methodology 
Control of Corruption 




Voice and Accountability 
Executive Recruitment and Constraints 
This diagram shows the causal relationship 
this study will attempt to confirm 
Each aITOW represents an expected positive 
cOITelation in the empirical analysis. 
I ncreased Basic 
Needs Satisfaction 
The research design is cross-national and longitudinaL enabling the study to test for covariance. 
establish time order and conduct multi variable analysis to control for nIh variables. The two 
hypotheses will be considered separately, testing basic needs satisfaction as a function of 
dispersed power across ten countries: Botswana, Ghana. Lesotho. Malawi. Namibia, Nigeria, 
South Africa. Uganda. Zambia. and Zimbabwe. 
The unit of analyses \vill be a country and its population. The level uf analysis for the extent of 











original level of analysis for the quality of life is micro from the responses of individuals, but the 
data will be aggregated to represent the population of a given country. Consequently, the study 
intends to create generalizable results about the relationship between the overall extent of a 
country's democracy and the extent of Ii ved poverty wi thin a gi ven country's population. 
Creating Indices 
Because there are various indicators for dispersed power, there may be correlations between the 
dependent variable and only some components of the independent variable. I will compare the 
correlations among different components of dispersed power and basic needs satisfaction, but I 
will also compare the components of dispersed power to determine if I can aggregate them into 
an index. 
Controllillgj(n· Wealth 
A strong correlation between dispersed power and improvements in basic needs satisfaction does 
not prove causation. So-called 'third' variables may be responsible for the relationship. I will 
consider the most common and probable competing explanation of wealth. I will control for 
Purchasing Power Parity GNI per capitan2 to determine if the observed correlations exist 
independently of the wealth of a country. 
Case Selectiol1 
The reliability and validity of the study are constrained by only using ten countries from 1998 to 
2004. There may not be enough countries or data to eliminate the effect of outlying data points; 
or the sample may not be representative of Africa across time and space. 
The limitations provided by the available data create a selection bias. The study uses a 
convenient sample from Africa; it is confined to countries for which data is available. Even if a 
positive relationship emerges between the independent and dependent variable, one could argue 
that results can only be extended to countries with similar infrastructures capable of supporting 
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\V"I~r Sm"lilCliol! 
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ENS Index 
('reJli Il~ an ] mla is jllSl] ri ,I )'I~ al th~ mKr" ,md lTI,ICm lewL ArTOhaTon.ctc'r r.::,,'aIThers cl)n!end 
I hal rc'sl,'n \e'\ or i ndi ,']duab I~nd lobe C"]",,1 elll aCro SS coml,'ne'lllS PI" basic needs 
,alisi'aCI]()n."" AddiTion:llly, aT Ih~ counlry le"d the comlXHle'nts call ne com),lned inw all inde, 
In iti ~i llle.l'UI "ment, l)f food. water ~md health ,afi,f<lctIOI) c~n be combi n,'Ci using I he pTl nci pk 
c"mron"nl, melhod M e.\tractlon for hctor anal J si" The I,'>U I ting (h-,nbClCh' , alph:L which 
measur~s how "'eli variahles C.ln be' c,'lllbinc'd inlo "J single uni-dimensi"nallalenl Cl)lblfLICl."(" 
is high f,,,hoth imtiallO 81 I and finJllcwls (O,941 ofsali,f",'[]on Th~ conSlruCI i, more lIni 
dimensional a, the <llphJ value appr"ach,', the numerical value "f on~, I.h~ cOlblruCl " ml)re 
lHuliidimens]()nal as alph" nears z~ro. The", high values me'an Ihal food. "'<lter and h"<lllhcare 
,ali,facli"n arc cl)n,i,tc'nt with one' anl)lher and Coil be combined int" a bJ,il' ne~d, salisbcliOl1 
index, 'x BNS 6< 
In 19% Zalll),ia had lhe l"w~, 1 le,'d or ),aSll' ne'ed, "ali,raclion al 17 percent. ~aI11ibia, 
Zimbabwe <llld Le'Sl)lhl) also had low B~S ~t> ~7. 31 and ~7 percent ,,'ere san, fi ed, r~'I""clivdJ 
In ifi~ll"""sur~ITlc'nts of [l"t''''ana and Ghana \H,""e ,,,er &l perc'enl haw: nee'l]<; ,ali,facli"n, 
follow~d by South Africa <It 63 P<'rc~nt , 
l\alllibia cxpcrie'nccd IIIC mO, 1 dl <1,lic iml'wvcment in basic n""d, 'Jlisfaelion 12R pen:en l I 
followed by South Africa ( t 8 perc~nl). M"lawi al1d r..."solhoholh irnpro,cd B~S by four perC"nt 
{ Figur~ ttL Ra,ic ne~d, saTisf:ll' IWl1 decreJ,~d in BOl:>wana by nin.:: percent and dr"pped by 21 
percent in J\igcria <lnd Zimb<lbwe (Figure 12). 
H Y 2oo'; nine per\."ent 0 f 7i l1l b,1 bweJl1S, I.he 10" e,l c)f all cOllnlrie". held lheir h<l> ic need, 
,ati,lie'll, Zamb La c'.\pe'riel1ced 1 S percelll B~ S, AI the' fi n<l 1 m,'asurelTlc'"t ROl '''' an a, Cihana 
South Africa outr<lced <llll)lhcr countr ie, by ,'ach ClChievil1g appr"xirna lely RO perc'cnL B~S (For 
complete dat<l see App,,"d]x AI, 
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i n dep~nJ~[\[1 y .. 1 v. i II coml)dL"~ :md COlllras!. l'oUlllTie< l"'rrorT1Lanc~s on Jifkr~nt Ji n",'n,iolb and 
cOl1si J~r I h~ po,si biut)' of forming dn i nd".~ 
>l. Rule oj' l ,,,"w 
The W ()rld Fl:>n k.' S Co",, mawe M<illerJ 1 Ii rating of 'Conl! 0 I of C OIflLplion' i nd i"ale, ru Ie 0 r low 
L n lhi, "Ilaly,i ,. The r:> ling place:; Ih~ bu l k ,-.f th~><, COLI ntries wcll bdow ideal Ie. ~Is of rule ()I 
10\\1. [n 19\1R Ihe a\' e ra~ e score W:lS -O.~ on" sc:lle.-.f -2 10 2, T,,'o years later the [J).'an ()flh~ 
cOllntrk, ,corcs imploH'd!O -0 .1 blLt Ill< ,,,ore , ,'aried """~ wid~l)' :>cr,,,s Ih~ r"gi,'Il, Uver the 
I",ri()d Cr"m 20CK) 10 200 .. , ttl<, c"lIntries ""f,' Ie" able 1O control c()Ti'uplion an d dropl"'d in Iheil 
'" con~l()mer:>le scor~ I" -OJ. 
Flmswana and S"lLth Afl ica had th~ highcst c,mlml or C(H'TUplL,m al lh~ mi lial m~asuren",'nt at 
0.53 and 0.42 resJX'Clivdy, ~Jmihia v. a;, the only co untry to ha"~ a "Lh,lanlially po,i ll\'~ score 
wilh (1.24. '-<igena h:>d Ih ~ Ie",' COn!rol of cOlTup!i()l) In I'l'JS with a "cor~ of .. [ .01 Uganda, 
Zdmhia. \1alaWl and Ghan a "'ere rela!lwly negaTi\'e, ranging from 0.4 (,-. 0.6, 
I)olswana an d Ghana i "'pro, ~d SLgn L ii "ani Iy b)' 0,33 ~nd 0.27 r"'IXcti, "I y SoU(h A frj ca hal 
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(kclin~d . l\owbl) Mala"" b) dIOI' I','J h)· 0.13 . Zilllbah"'l' has Il(}L:ndl'l"~d Wilh a lkcr~a,e of 
0.88 (Figur~ 14 ) 
BOIswana rerain s (he Iigll[~Sl cOn!wl " I" corruplion ar 0.66. 1"0110'" ed at a di <1Jnc~ hl' S,'Llth Afr ica 
a( OAS. ~allliiJ ia is lhl' onl) (Xher I'l)Sil i\c .,COrC (().IS I as M 2U()4. Whik Uganda. 7.1lnbia allli 
Mala\\'i ha\'~ link control on lh~ir Cl)lmplion.i'>igeria Jnd Zil11bab\\'~ are th~ Inc"t cor rupl 
countrie, with scores of I j I and 1.01 (Fnr cl)mpl~ [~ dara see App~ndi, F) 
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b. Ci vil and Political Fr~~doms and £.qualitJ 
TIlr~~ indical,'" froTH Fr~~dolll H()u>;~ r~ p fl':>clll frl'cdl)llls and ~qll"lity: t "r~~d()]n of rhc Pr~ ,;,. 
Ci\ i I Lib~n i~s an d Polil ical Ri gh1> , f'r~" fr~ ed'lT]];' a~roS.\ lh~ group of ~(}U1111 i~ s hil\'~ grad" Jll}-
lmproHd from 1 'l'l8 I" ~OO, ! I h~ m~an \~,'re ha~ 1",,~11 four poinlS 1"1"0111 ~U to 5~ 011 :1 'Cilk ,'f 
I ()J-(w~r I h.: ,;i ~- y~ar J"" oll Th L \ ,;cOrC I'; a r~ vcrsal l)f hc~dOln fi oll,e', orlgi nal ,c,J1~ m 










consiJcred 'nOi free' "ilh J s",'fe oro to -to. ' panly frcc' when sC('Iing -1-0 t" 6'1 and 'free' f0r 70 
10 100.'" 
S"uth Arrica, Bulswan a Jnd "Jmi biJ began the p" ri od of s(Udy ". ilb (ile gr~Jle'l pr~" 
frCl'dollb ._. ~ll "i th IC, 'fe' "no "f ab," ~. tI.! a b" i and L gandJ wer~ classified JS PJr! Iy fre~ 
W11 h scores of bO. I .es0tho, / .aml:ii a, c: h:ll1a Jnd /j TTln:lh",'e were"" 1 he TTl"rg1 n of p~rl l y rr~e and 
nm free. r>-igeria "J< wdl behrnd (he reSI :md " 01 free ""L lh a ",lI ing of 7. 
Fr~~dolll or Ihe pre;,s iTTlpro \'ed hy I ~ poims in Lesolllll and dfastically imprll\cd In Gilana ~nJ 
"igena, withlumpl oP:2 and --In rc;,pcclivcl) (FiglLfe 151. Lc;,,,th;, mo'ed wilhin tile parlly free 
rangc. Nigeria rockCled frllfll "i r(uall y no Irccdum to the' llliJdk range ,,1' part Iy fIT~, C:ilJn~ \\'J, 
ll1erdy on lile verge "f l>\:c0ming pJnially free in IW~ , l:iut leapl all Ihe ''''y!O a free pres> 
S,,,,(h Ali-icl inneased pre" freedolJl h)' a mere 41"" "l,. wbrle Bol,w"na merely ilul'lu:JleJ. 
Li IJlbab\\ e Jnd MaiJwi e~ p~rienced (he lar ge:;t degradati on; 0f pr~s> fre~do 111> wi 1 h decreases ,,1' 
2g al1J 12 respeCli'ely (Figure 16) , Namihia degraJ~J sligh!!}. hUi ret"ins" fr ee pre". Malawi 
JTlJPpeJ Ihrough the ",mge ofparllal fr~edom :mJ Ug~nda JippeJ a link. Whli~ on Ihc Ihre,h,,1J 
llf p~rti al freedc)m Ln i (JlIR, Zimbabwe \\' a" th0l"ugh Iy 11 0( fre~ l:iy 200-1-; ZambiJ a 1;0 degraded 10 
n01 fre~. 
By 200·. Soulh Africa. (jh an ~ ~nJ Bohwana remain the ,'n il' c, 'untric, to score alx".-c 70. Pr~" 
in /i mbabw~ is much more 1i glnly conlro lied (h:1I1 in :1111' 01 her <'(Juntry M os l of I he C0l1nni es 
arC panly free. 7:JmhiJ. J.I1J 7i I11b:Jh,,~. hoth (~1 the bmder of p~rli:J I fre edoTTl in111al ly, JTe now 
(be only pfc;le, c0n,idered nO( free (['or c01llpiclC da(J see Appcndi~ GI , 
Increases in Press Freedom 
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1998 1999 :>000 :>001 ;>:)O~ 2003 2OJ4 
Year Saurce: FreeJom HUlise i 
PoiL tical fLg hiS all d ci ,,11 Ii b~rties r~Inai n ~d rdali vdy ~om.tant behH:C'l 1998 alld 2004, L'slIIg 
Fr~~uOIll H"ll'~ ' , s~ven-rOlnt >calc. but re\'er,in~ ;tto male high~r llumb~rs connute more 
1'1 e~dolll. mean ~Ii(ic al righ(s illlpwI'ed only O. I I to -',7 i alld ",,·il Ii bertics 1 emai ncd th~ "am~ 
(3.6) , The fo Ilowi ng grapbs combine <:1 \' II Ii kr(l~' (CLl and po li (i cal ri gh(;; {PR :> "i mp I, hy 
addillg (b<:m (ogdh"T and d"'luing by lwp I(CL+PRii2). By r~v~"illg Fr~~dom Hmi,e labc'ls. 0-
1.5 is "'~I,idered 'rwt free,' >1- is l~gardcd as 'partly fr<'e' anu 4.5-6 i, 'free.''' 
Sou(h Mri<:a had (h~ high~"L r ~'r~cl for polilicall'igh(, anJ civil iLlx'ni~, In 1995: r..;ig~['ia and 
Zimhahw~ had (h~ low~'L SOUTh :Urlc'a. Bot,wana. Mal"wi and r..;arJllhi~ wer~ Iree: all o(her 
CUlllllrle, ... ~r~ wn'L!kreJ partly Ira 
Ci'illilx'rties <lIld poli(i,'al rigb(s in (;hall~ anu Le",(h" lInrrov~J thc l1lu"1.lx~h achi~\~ (k 
iakl of free IFi gllr~ 17}. 7~lllbi~ ~nd r..;i~~l1a r~main~d parlly fr~~ hL!llmpro\ed ,lightl y. Righ(s 
and libertie, decayed 1110S1 drast ical ly i n )o.lal~ Wl ~nu 7imbabw~ I Fig'" ~ I 8). )0.1 alaw: urop)><d 
from fr~~ (0 partly fr~e: Cgallda d~clill.,.j slighlly bu( r~maineJ panly fr ~~ : an,l Zimhab ... c 
Tn<.lV~d from tbe '~r g~ ofpan ly fr"~ to "olidly n,~ free. 
Bpl, ... ana. South Art Lca and l" ami bi a rem"i n ~,l UI1 chang",1 anu the ;,(rongest prokctoTS of ri ghlS _ 
Zimhab\.e C< 'lllinuc, (0 ,llO\\ the !cHI r ~sJX'l' t for poli li~~l nghts and ci \ i I Ii b~r(i~, Fi \ ~ 
co"ll1rie" in (ile regl(ln arc l'l\f1sid~r~d fr ~e by tinalmeasu re, co mpared to fo ur inllially. Four 
more arc partial ly free wh il.: hm hah"e" I.h~ ''Illy collnlly tha( is 110t free (For compkLe data sec 
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c. I'arl icipation 
Tn rlleJSlL['e parlicip~li""l j wil l uSc' daw fwm II'ES to calculalc Ih~ ral i0 vf \'OI,' r lurn0UliO 
vlll,' rs regislcr,'d." All lh~ Cl1 l1 lllriCI in qU"SllOIl h,lw had IW0 declil1ll years ,,"c ~ 199R_ 
l-'~rTi ('ipJ li 0n hal vari~d widdy ~JTll1ng <'lllJl11T!,,~ and ha, ~hang:e-d ,!u ile dramalically !J<,'"""n 
dec I i, 'n, in gL \"~Il count"", 
Pa1!idp~li(,'1l rJnged fr"m 48 w 94 PC1T~~lt in II .. , firsl dec li0ll \hlawi and S,'Ulh Afm'~ 
~chi"\',,d Ih" hi~h~SI rurnoul wLl h 94 and R91k"r<'~m rc',pccliw,ly In \lar~ C"nlrJSI Zimbahwe 
and \li g~riJ had lurn'~ Ll' ,'1 4H ~nd 53 rli:rc,'nt re'rli:Clivc!y_ 
Palliclpalion In Gh,ma Jncrc'J'c'd b~ 25 percent, N'IJTlibia by ~2 p.,'rccnl and r-;Lg"ri~ hy 17 p,'TCCT1t 
',Fig lL['e 19). P~r li(')pari ,,"1 ,,~, m0r~ th~n CUT in half i 11 \ 1 ~b,,· j, lal li Ilg h)' Sri p~Tc"n I I Fi gUT~ ~O ). 
P"Tli~ip~li"ll dr<.'ppcd hy I I p~rc"!lI in '0l1lh Africa and live percenT in Le,,~hll _" 
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M,'si ret'enl meaSllres sho\\ Ih~1 UhanJ ~nd Namibi~ ha\~ tll<: best p,lftil'ipJ IWn with 85 percenl, 
r>.1 JlaW] and /i ll1hJbwl' ar~ th~ on l} Cc)U nui~' I,) hJve les, I h,1I1 hJlf of regi ,I ered wier, lurn,)lJ1 








Increases in Participation 
(over 5 percent) I rigu -e 19 
I a Election', '1 
[I Election 21 , 
Namibia Ni'J"ria Source, iFFS 
Decreases in Participation 
(over 5 percent) 
a Election 1 
, Ill EleCtion 2 
S()ut~ Afnca Les ctho Malal"; Source, .lFFS 
d. Comp r lil ion 
I lI',C the PoIlI." IV rllC'asUI C' of 'Po li tica l Competilion' to rcpresent competit ion N Using I h~ 
eight colLn!ries in '" hich da l a L' a, ~i Jah Ie ~I all rOll! mc aSlLrement,. the ind icator nhibit, lilll~ 
ag~I'C'~atC' chan~e an"" I he COlLn tri e,," T kTC' i, a lso \'el y lillk Chllllge "ithin mdi ,'idlLal 
COlLntt Ie" 
In 1 998 Ho[, "'Jna, SOUl h Africa, )';"mi hi J an d \ lJ lawi were the mo,1 cnmp.e lil i "e, a ll ret'ei "ing 
'oCOTC', of nJrJo: Uganda Jl\ll 7.imhahwe 'h'Te Ihe ka,1 cunLpetiti,~" ,th SCOTe of two Lesutho 










Ghana ,,~, the onl., cou ntry to improve , r>.1alawi "as til c onl., nne 10 d l'di ne Each counlry 
, h; ingcd by one po inl 
In 200+ Bol,,,, ,\!la, S(\U I h Arrica, N~mi hia ~nd (; nana w"r" the most C(JmrL'1 i, i ve, L g~nd,1 and 
Zimbab" e r~m~i n ~d Ih" I~"'I COIJlj>L'1 iti v~. L ron h~ 1 ng ran k~d 1-<,'OIho rcc~i ,."d a ,~ven ~nd 
t\igeriJ a fi\~ IFiglHC 21} tFm cllmpl~le dala 'cc Append1x Kl . 
Changes in Pol itical Competition 
Fi~ u rc 21 
w , 
" - -0 , 0 
a~ 
0 " - - - ----_.- - - 01998 > 2 , , - t:.I2004 • , , , 0 -, I rl I o - . -
c. .-\ r~ou nta bilit)-, 
T hl' Wor ld 13 ~nk and I'd in !\ ' pnnilk lL,d'ul IllC a, lLh:' I'or accolLJllan i Iii y. Th~ \V mid Bank'" 
(;n, 'erna l1a Marin, 1\" has In i n(hcal(Jr "nti tkd . V oicc ~nd ACC(Junwbi lily" 111m sc.:ks w galLge 
lhe allm ulll of inplLl p~op I~ ('an haw 1 n ll>c g(Jwr n "",,11 )" Th~ mea,ur" ('orr~'I)() nds to the 
conCL'pl (Jf wnica l lKcountabilil)' Ix,JUSC it slrclcil..:' s OCIWCen lrc peoplc a.n d lile govcrnll\..:'1ll 
Po!ill' H' h'1> l wo , uh cOllL~pb, . Fx~cu l i V~ l -Dn Slrai nr-' ~nd 'Fx~cuti ve Rccrui InlL'nt,' lil a1 
cNrespnnd wi lil ilnnzomal lKCO lLni ahi Ii l y . ." Th~,,, indica l()l" m~a,Uf" l h~ 0l"'nn~." and Ih" 
Ii "Hi' of t he cxecuti \ e, prj nJar; Iy "i lilin lix' fran .. ',yOI k or [ix, go VClJlll"'n!. 
Verli",,! ACL'OI mwhifiry 
T hl' W orkl 13 ~ nk' S ' Voice and Accounl ani lity ' ranks lhc maioril y or lilc!>.: Co "nl< l~' n ~ga ll \'(' I y. 
bU l l he JH'r~gc raring hilS ris.cn slighlly I +OJ)6 i fr" nl I'i<JS to 200-t " 
In 1 'N~ only Smll h ,Urrea, Bol ,wana al1d 1\-~llli hi a w"r~ pmilJ \'d y r~l ~d, r"""i \']]1 g 'Lor~, or 
O,~ 7 . 0.77 and 0 ,+2 fCS pecli vel y, Nlgcri a '" as the 1110" poor I)' rakd wi Ih a rali ng 0 r - 1 AR. The 
(JI h l~' Slron gl y nl'gati \ e countri l'S \\ ell' Zi nl b ~b\\'l' ( -() , 7J i. Ugancla (-11.6 I J and Ghana (-0.53 i 
Nlg~ria ; ncrca,~d draTlLalica ll), by O. R4 Gh~na fJl(Jv~d h)' all a,loun(Eng 0.92 ul1 d L~'>()lho 
plL,>h,,:'d slead i I Y lLpWlll ds ny 0,29; si gni fi canll), Ih~,c COlLJllnc'S al,o moved i'ro m negul , \'e 10 
pI'S iIi ,·e SCOl CS (Figure 22}, Zi ",nab",e. Malawi and 7 a' lJ bla c' .~pcrr"nLcd the flIoq W' ~r~ 











AI Ihe: finalllrn.: (,f mea,urern.:nt ill 2U(J..1., th~r,> WJ' J ,rarl di, i<k krwccll ('OUmriL.' with 
p",iti,'c ratmgs (South ,-\fricJ, H(ltSIIJIlJ. N,lrnihiJ, Gbal1J and L~sorho) ~nd tho: r~'t with YUlh:: 
nc~ati\l: ,('On::S. Even among,t m~ny n~gJtivc "or"'_ 7imhahwc', ,('orC or - I 411 stand, (lUI as 
the: WO,S( 'Voicc and A('L('untahilily' (Fm LOmpklc data ,"~ "ppc:ndi.\ U_ 
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If (Jri~(J,,!al ! \('( olln/ahi/in 
Poiily 1 V ra l in~ of 'F.xc'~u I i \ ~ R~crui 11l 1<:n I' a'><'s,,", e~c'cul i "e Iran;;f~r" tl"l<' CCITl L~'L,titi WLl~" of 
necuti w sekc! ion, a,nd lh~ o[,ennc'" or ac'cu Ii w recTlLL I "le'n!. Tile' ",or~, of i miL 'Ldual 
cou lHrL~' ar~ spr~ad from tl)rl'~ to eight. ! hu, COWTlng moSl '1f the z,-,,,,-to-len ,calc Th~ 
"ggregat~d seor~ acro;;;; countri~s ha, irnrfo,~d I j O.SS I."" 
Tn I ')L)~ HOh" an" alld South Afri CJ I)Jd I h'-' LOOSI 1 ~gu I"tion of ~x~eLLti \'-' r'-'CfLLlull~nt d~nowd by 
theIr scorc" of eigh l l>blawi and r-,' ami bi J ,cor~d ,,"Veil, L gan d'l fi ve alld Zi mbJhw( seor~d tl", 
lo"es[ with thr"" 
Llmbia impro\~d by a striking few,- [,oinls and Ghan~ InCfc'J;;ed by lhr"" Non~ oflOC ~olLntri6 
e~ra i ~nced all Y decline'. 
BOlswana, C:hana, L"">l.ho ;;nd Soulh Al"rica ~un~nlly enjoy t h~ he'l faling of 'f:, ~c'culi Y~ 
R.:~rui ITrwn! ' wi th ,cores of ~ig ht, Zim babw( mai iH"in,-,d th'-' hw ~s./ SCOT'-' '" Ltl) a thr~~, Wh'-'n 
'iigena's r"ling w,,, aVd' IJhle, il WJ, .1 '''\'('n ( Figure 24) (1'0.- compi('k dora ,~e App~nd i x :1,1) 
---"-----C-h-'-"-g-'-'-i-"-E-'-'-'-"-t-i'-'-R-'-CrUitm~,~"~t~===~l 
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PaMy IV 
j 
The I'oli 11 IV TlL~"sur~ of 'Ex~CU1i w Con;;tr"; nt,' T'-'PT,-,>entS "conslraints <lll 1I-"; dtci;;ion- rna\'in~ 
pow~" of ~hid e.~~cut i "~s"-" Indiv idUJ I ;;core;; "rt ,prt,ld aero" ,I ["ng~ from two to "-'~~n, 
;\cros s all eOLLntri~s O'''r Ih~ p'-'f iod 01' Ii n)C HI '1u~'lion lkre WJ..' a ",c'an lnLTc';;'~ of 0.25 " 
Ho(;;wana In d South ;\ fri CJ had I h~ highest sec)1 ~s at tl)~ i Ili!ial m,-,asLLr~,,).'nl, L'ganda and 
7i [Jlh~hw(· rL'c~i wd I h~ lowesl rali ngs of 1\\,0, A Ii CJ(h~r rJted cou nt.-i t, rtc~i ved fj w or six, 
C:Mana irn l'wwJ by' !"o po im, and l\h);;" i illLproWJ hy on'-' pOlnl Zimb"bw~ was lhc' on ly 
counlry 1CI d~clin~ and dlorr~d by on~ poill1 , 
BOl""~na, Soulh Al'fira and Le'Olho rc'lain the higk'l r~ling' " ,1.11 ,~v~n EXCTU II WS in ligand" 
and Zimhdh,w I';;c~ lMe' kaSi ~on-,Irainb 'i i gc'f L~ f~~~l 'L,d ~ l'in~1 ,corc' o r fi "e (Figure 2.1) II'0f 
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Summary of Pemoc.rafic COnfnt 
What I his d"",ri rti ve re\'iew of th~ r-a, ic " vid"nc" _,hmn, i_, thaI Ihc n!c'n! oj dC11locracy i, 
dynamic_ In g~n"raL acr""s The Ten cOlLlllri~_, accounlahilily and freed011l' Ioa'c i11lprovcd while 
lhe; ruk or law hJS ddaiof3lcd. And ""hilL COlllpctilioll and parti~ipation remain lLn~hJngcd 
olc'rall, they v~ry widdy acro." coumri~:;, Tk:;~ dim,'nsion, _,eem io vary in a con,i,len! WJy 
acro" ~ounTri,,_,_ 
DClllOCrJCY in Li 11lbahwr i, ccrtainly on lh" Jcc~ nc a, t h ~ country ar~rien-.;.;d Ihe mOSl negative 
chang" in almost ~\'c'ry di mensi on Th~ owral l level of d~m,,-.;racy in Zi mbabv.c i, noV. Ie", cr 
lhan olhcr ~o lLmric_, acro,_, vi rLualh' all di mcn, ions, WIoi Ic YlalJwi u nd"rw,'nt m~n y n"gali ve 
change,. it do::; not ~xp~'ficnc,' as low ~n 0 ""rail quality of d"nmnacy a, Zimr-abwc, Comparc'd 
with oTh,'r countrks, Zamhia scor~d most poorl], on The fr~eJomm"a,urc, of dnllocraC)-, wh ile-
1\ Ig"[1 a and U gan.da r"~'" ved low _'Corc_, compJrcd with olhcr countrics for ru k 0 r bw and 
accoulllabili l y_ 
(;hana h"" imprm-"d d~mocrJCy on e,,,ry dimelhimL Lc,mllo al;,o dc·ep-.:;nc·d d~m,xr~cy ~crn" 
Jlmml all di m~n,ion' Bols\\ana_ SOlLlh AfncJ and ~amibia, fo llov.cd closely r-y (;Ilana and 
u,otho, _,cor" aho"" oth"r cOlLntrics on mO,l dimcnsion" 
Accountal:>i lity prcs,'nt~d romc inkr~'llng "mr"-icJI findini':" arrcaring to confirill to The 
Jnalytical dislilK!ion hetwc,'n \~ ni c~1 and hori!()ntal accounlahility In ,ome countrk'.lh,'sc 
m~asure, mo""d In di'rarJl" dir" cll()[K Zimr- ia, for inslancc", impl'Oh'd in 'EXCCUTiw 
R,,~ruiTm"nt' hut d"dineJ in 'Voi~e and A~counlJbihl)-' SLmilarly. Malawi illlPWh'd in 
. F.UCUll "" Constraints bm d"" Imed III . Voice and ACcoulllalJili I v _. 111~ rolf IV I Ii n""J,ures 
rri mJri I}' In[ accountabi Ii ly of the e_~cclLli I e withi n ~o'cmj~1l1 (100"; I.Onwl a~counlabi li l )-'-i 
while- the World Bani< mC'a,lLCC' cOlbidcrs accoumJbilily IlWtT hroadly JS !h" link b~l\\e"n 
~overn ment and thc' ]l<-'DP Ie- ('> crtlCal accoull1ah i I i Il' l " 
Althou ~ h th"r~ ar" g:en~ral lr~nd, ~cro" Ih",e c'C"l11lr ics, Ihc dLln~n sion , dC'11l ocrac)- do nOI 
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mu Itidi nk;rNon al and ~alLlion a~~i nsl rdymg: On On~ aggreg~ll' mc asur~_ Th~rc ar~ a , ~rkl y or 
cxpl~naliolb i"OT Ihc,,' dL;,parilie'_ Th~ ri,,1 is Ihal "hangc, in dimen"on, of Jcm(><:rac'y Jo nol 
alwJys occur lOg~lh<:r and can h ~pp.;n al Ji fkr~nl Ii IllcS and 'Pl'~d s. l'wn i i- part of thl' san", 
in l ~Tconn~CT~d proc~,>s, Anolh<: r po,>,ibi li ty is thJt tl,,; di=nsions Jr~ indqxndl,m or distinct 
from Oll~ ~noth.,;r ~nd do n 01 n,'c~ss~ri I y chang~ logerh<:r ~s p~rt of on e overa\chi ng d~mocqlic 
procc,,_ How~"~r, a hromkr ,ampk of COUnTri~s m~asur~d OV~I ~ long~r time p<:riod "ould b~ 
ne"~,,ary 10 s~[lk lhlS 'llL~Slion 
A third possi bi Ii I Y is lh al thl's~ indTc amI', ar~ i na(kquatc rq)f~s~lllalions or the ~Oll",'ptS lhl:} 
intend to nlCJSure, This is 1lI0S1 li kdy to apply 10 participalion measure's, a., lhey only r~pr~sclll 
poli'ical PJnicip~tion at discret~ points (i,e. dections), A final possihility is that th~se 
JUI\en,ion;, dos~n 10 mc a;,ur~ J~TlKX;r"",y ,11<lU IJ nol ~ "on~cpluall)' Ii n kd h~~au,~ on~ or 
l11orl' concept or suh -concl'pl i! not 'dclllocrali~_' HoriLontal accountahilily Illay nOl be 
inh~r~nt)y dl'lllOCratic," Ix,t il is oftl'n ~'1)nsider~d n~Cl'ssary to Jelllocratic gowmance, D..,;,pit~ 
J, rkr~n~~, \x:Tw~~n \ ari abks, all di m~nsion, of d~TlH>cracy ar~ su ffi~i~nll y si mi tar 10 r,~' m ~n 
inJc.\ 01 di,p~T",d 1~'weT, a I~nnl I wlll no", ~Jdr~,,_ 
Vi.<;pl"n,ed !'ower Index 
The dim~n"on, of Jcmo"ra~y ,k,"rihtod ahovc' S~~llll0 l~p a "ommon undalYLn~ a.,pt'L! of 
d~lnocracy th~tl call di,pcls.cd powcr. In chJPI~r IWO I d~scribcd how ~J<:h dim~nsion could 
~mhDdy t' knk:nt, of disp~TI-Cd power ILke Ii Illi I~J, I-Cparalt'd or ,hart'J power. Whik lhi, 
n,,;or~licalluotilicali()n is n~cl's"lr} to form an inocx, li>e indicalOrs must also cOTrdatl' with 0'-"'; 
ann ll""r 
Formi ng an l nd~x is ~mpir i~ all y .11LslifLahk. Th~ i ml ial Illt'as ur t'Tl.:ont, 01 Ihe dim~n,lOllS of 
dl'mocr~cy 'ary togethe r with a Cronb~ch', alph~" of 0, m, The fi nal m~a,ur~m~nt, vf T h~ 
dilTl~n,ions hav~ In alpha 01 0.71, Th~ cio,a Th<:S~ nUlTlh~" ~r~ to the numt.;,r on~_ Ih~ Tllor~ th~ 
indicalor> , 'ary togdht'r , 
Forming ~ d"p~rsw p<,wl'r itxkx i, u",rulTo r mk~ bro;xl compariwn, with h~sic n~~ds 
salisf~ction. bUI analyzing ~Jch of the Jime n;;on;, of d~mocracy re mains Ih~ promine nt focus or 
Ihis Jnalysis . I al11 discussing ~ pot~nti~1 inde:>. hec~usc the notion ofdi'P<'rs~d power dexs s~,'m 
to ha\'~ SOTlle' v~lidity_ Wh,k aggr~g~ling Ih~ indica!Ors may contribut~ to th~ liT~raTur~ with Th~ 
"oll~~pl or di'P<'rI-Cd p<lwer, explorin ~ Ihe imli vi du~1 i ITlp"",l, or lht' dimen,ion, r~main, oi 
paraillou III imp<)f[ ~n"t' , n untkrSlanding Ine comp la nalure of Jelllocra~y 
l: ,i ng di sp,;rse'd powcr JS a g~n~r al gu id~ to judge d~lI1ocracy pro\' id~s a gross SU 1Tl111ary of Ih~ 
dime'n,ions of rule' of I~w. po l il,,~1 and civil rights. pJrticirxl1ion, COTllp<:t ilion ~nd <>;;c'oUlliabilily_ 
Th~ COlLntrk, ar~ \'~ ry ,Ii\~rs~ in Ih~ir lew", of di'P<'rs~J powt'r and Ih ~ "h~ng~' during 111<: Ii"", 
pl'rilXl 
In I<:N8 Soulh _Africa Jnd H01SWJna had th~ highl'sl kvd ordi,pe,,~d pow~r , rollo",~d Ln a 
diSlanl Ihml hy NaTllIhia. 7~mbiJ anJ I:gamla had rd~li\'t'I)' hille disp..::rscd 1~)\Vt'r and 











Di,pcrscd powcr incr~Qs~d dl ~lllati cally in GhJn Q, i I1lprovcd ,ubstann ally in Zamhi" and d gel! 
up slightly in Na lllibi J. SGu[h Afl iCJ, Bot,wJJla and L ganda d~gmdN on the' diSP<'r,~d ["l"er 
indcx. ~lalJwi droppcd significJIHly and ZimhJbwc pIUtnlll~t~d from:m ~Ir~ady low l~\'d 
B J ~l)()5 (;llana had puslwd past coull1ric<; with grc'at~r pr~,-i Ol" k ve h of di ,persed po" er 10 
h~''C th~ thlrd grc'~lest diopersion GfpGwer. Sowh Africa and Rot,w:m~ m~lIH~lIled Ihc highest 
kwl, of disp.: rS"d p''',er. N;lTnibiJ and Lesotho also hah' a ,kc~nt amoulH or di'P<'"ed iX'wer 
oy r~c~n l m~aoures. I.ambia. \1 ~iJw i and l\ igclia haw iilt l~ di op~"illn of [X'wer Uganda il ha, 
evcn leI, iX)we] d"P<'roion ". hi i~ Zi Illh ahw~ h~, I hc I~a' l anI< 'unl of (bpw,ed powcr (I :igur~ 26) 
(For COlllple[e data >ce Appendi ~ 0\" 
Dispersed Power Index 
Figure 26 
nlC Polem/ally Cun/,)[mdmg l'({pm I 0/ lI"eal/1l 
Bdor~ d.s<:u'Slng any emp"ical rebllon,h]p' hem-~en dilll~n"on' ()f d~lllocracy and ba"c need, 
»ali,fa(:llon II is ne"C~'o~r~' In ~cknowi~dg ~ Ih ~ pOlcnllai Llllpa<:l of olher 'Ihird' ,ariahle" If I am 
<;ucccs,fui in c,tahlilhing a clear relalinn>Jllp belwcen dcmocracy and basic necds satisfaction. 
critics lllay cGntend [h~t thi s Ielationship is Silllply due [0 pric·rlcwis ofwc'aJth. whi<:h 
,i lllUIt :ln~OU, Iy ~ifcC[ both d~lHocratic rrogr ~s, an d th~ sal i ,facti on of haole ne~ds. 
Thus before concluding lhi, CharleL I pre,ent ,Gille descri ptive ev]dencc about toc ovcrall 
wcalth of the coulltri e, in que>!io/L In orde! [0 mca, ul'c national", ealth. I usc ("ross l\ al ional 
I nCOlll~ I G~ I I p~r capita, cJlculaled usi n g PUI'C hJsing pG" ~r parity.'" Th,' World Ihn k uses Ihi, 
111c'thod of calculation "fol' accurate IllcaIUI'Cm,'nt or powny and "ell-lx: ing"becausc it !nO\l 
accura tely lllCaSul'e, Ihc capacity or all individual!.o purcha,c goc·ds or SCI vice,,, ithin a gi"~n 
cou nn) .'J L pGn ,i ,ual insp,'C[i(~l. th~l\: is a distinct ,eparation \x:[wecn low~r-middle i n<,'om~ 
and uPlx'r-midd le incom~ cGu mrk, '» 
South Africa. Bol'>wana and N ~lJ]i oi ~ w~r~ Illuch Illore w~a l lhy [han the re,t or the countries in 










l'(m,idered l ow-lncom~ countrie l , Malawi was Ih~ p(lOr~51 country ill lernll oj UNj per CJpita 
IFi~ur~ ~7J (1:(1[ compkte d~l~ 'CcO Appendix p ) . 
. _.;=-==il 
Gross National Income per Capita I: F<lure 2i I 
(Purchasing Power Parity), , 
:fl==~=;=;======== 10 t900 
n n 
I IU 11111 O/lsNl'<Il;,,".' 111'1<1111 BNS "lid DI_Ipu.led I'"",-a 
E"en throu)!.h ~",ual \,;<u,11 il1speclioo of the d~la_ th~'e ,Ire ob"iou< _,imil",i lies betweel1 halil' 
Ileedl sa(;,t'actiol1 anJ llle~Sllrc, ot' di,pcrleJ power. South Africa. Ghana. BObWJIl<l. Namibia 
Jno uWlho mually scor~ in Ik lOp hJlf 011 oo th l1lealU1T,. ei(her b) lcvel or ch"nge. ~igeria, 
/ "ll1lhiu al1d /il1lbabwe tend (0 app,oar"t tb,o!xl1toH! of !xllh variable rankingl 
Y CI .i u,tif,i Ilg COnCern, about Ihe confound i ng i nlpJC( of We" Ith. South Afri ~J, Bot,WJIJa and 
~al1libla also ¥e far abow other countries' ppp U~ I pt.'r cupi la. \!alaw;, N;geriJ ,md hmbi" 
h"'e Ibe 1,""e_'1 (iNT per ~"pil"'; ZiH!b~h"'e i_, the (lfJl, ~()Unlf)' gellln~ p()(llTr in ~r-,olu!~ lerm, _ 
H()w~wr. there are db() sollle pri",al'lci~ ditTcrel1ce, belwcen wealth and di,pcr",d powcr. 
Ghana r.cing the mOlt no(ab Ie ex~ nlpk with high lew!> of d ispel'led power but ran ked low on 
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Chapter Four: Research Findings 
Two hypotheses guide the empirical testing in this chapter. The first hypothesizes that initial 
levels of democracy (measured as various aspects of dispersed power) correspond with 
subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction. This conjecture is statistically tested on every 
dimension of democracy, and then tested again controlling for initial levels of wealth, which 
addresses concerns that the observed relationship might be spurious, disappearing once I take 
wealth into account. A correlation with this control will substantiate a relationship independent 
from a country's wealth. 
Hypothesis (1) 
a. DemocracY(initial) ~ Change in Basic Needs Satisfactioni 
b. DemocracY(initial) ~ Change in Basic Needs Satisfactiont 
The second hypothesis speculates that the effect of democracy on BNS might be instantaneous 
rather than delayed. It hypothesizes a relationship in which changes in democracy correspond 
with simultaneous changes in basic needs satisfaction. I also anticipate questions about whether 
such an observed relationship is simply a function of initial levels of either wealth or democracy 
(measured as aspects of dispersed power). I test this in four different ways: (1) the change in 
democracy and the change in basic needs satisfaction; (2) the change in democracy and the 
change in basic needs satisfaction, controlling for the initial level of wealth; (3) the change in 
democracy and the change in basic needs satisfaction, controlling for initial levels of democracy 
(4) the change in democracy and the change in basic needs satisfaction, controlling for the initial 
level of democracy and wealth. 
Hypothesis (2) 
a. Change in Democrac/ ~ Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction 
b. Change in Democracy ~ Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction t 
c. Change in Democracy+ ~ Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction 
d. Change in Democracy:j: ~ Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction t 
1 Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction = (Basic needs satisfaction(tinall - Basic needs satisfactionllnltial) 
, Controlling for initial level of wealth 
11 Change in Democracy = (DemocracY(tinall -DemocracY(inlllal)l 
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I. Hypothesis One 
DemocracY(initial) ~ (Basic needs satisfaction(final) - Basic needs satisfaction(initial)) 
I test hypothesis (1) both through visual inspections of scatter plots as well as through statistical 
correlations between initial levels of democracy and changes in basic needs satisfaction.91 I will 
discuss the tests done on each dimension of democracy as well as with the overall Dispersed 
Power Index. 
I will then control for initial levels of wealth (PPP GNI per capita), first statistically and then 
manually separating countries into low and high wealth. A listing of correlations between basic 
needs satisfaction and democracy in low wealth countries can be found in Appendix S. I will 
consider Malawi, Zambia, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe to be low wealth and 
Namibia, Botswana and South Africa to be high wealth. The basis for this division is two-fold. 
First of all, the World Bank has labeled countries between a GNI per capita of $876 and $3465 
"lower-middle income" and countries between $3466 and $10725 "upper-middle income.,,92 
Initial levels of the seven low wealth countries, fall below the cut of $3465 (Zimbabwe's initial 
GNI per capita of $2680 is the highest of the low wealth group). Namibia, Botswana and South 
Africa are well above the cut; Namibia is the lowest of the high wealth group with an initial GNI 
per capita of $5790. 
The second reason for such a division is to emphasize the importance of the level of democracy 
in influencing basic needs satisfaction. My reasoning flies in the face of arguments that assert 
that certain levels of wealth are a necessary prerequisite for democracy. Previous analyses of 
democracy have noticed that almost all democracies above a GDP per capita of US$4000 have 
remained democracies.93 Those in favor of autocratically guided development below this wealth 
threshold assert that democracy is a negative rather than a positive influence for poverty 
reduction.94 However, I assert that, especially at low levels of wealth, the level of democracy is 
vital in contributing to satisfaction of basic needs. If this is the case, the relationship between 
democracy and basic needs satisfaction should become even stronger when we consider only low 
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a. Rule of Law 
Does the extent to which a country observes rule of law affect subsequent levels of basic needs 
satisfaction? I attempt to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using 
Afrobarometer survey data for change in basic needs satisfaction and Governance Matters IV 
'Control of Corruption' for the initial measure of rule of law. This first test of hypothesis (l) 
shows that control of corruption as measured in 1998 correlates modestly with changes in BNS 
over the next six years. 
This test shows a modest correlation between control of corruption (measured in 1998) and the 
change in basic needs satisfaction (Pearson's r = 0.47) (Figure 28). The horizontal line denotes 
the zero point where there is no change in basic needs satisfaction. Amongst only low wealth 
countries, thus excluding Namibia, Botswana and South Africa, the correlation is further 
depressed (r = 0.30) (Appendix S). 
Figure 28 



































Control of Corruption 1998 
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R Sq Linear = 0.219 
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L...-_______________________ Source: World Bank and Afrobaromete 
As we will see repeatedly, Zimbabwe appears to be a significant ·outlier.' Explaining the 
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regression line in figure 28 predicts that Zimbabwe (given its measured level of control of 
corruption in 1998) should have done much better in meeting basic needs. 
While hypothesis (1) only considers initial level of corruption control, and not changes in control 
of conuption, it is important to note that the choice of the initial measurement period, in the case 
of Zimbabwe, makes a huge difference. The World Bank only measures 'Control of Conuption' 
every two years. In 1998 Zimbabwe received a score of -0.13 but in 2000 received a score of -
0.87. This is a large degradation considering it only exists on a scale of -2 to 2 and is nearly 
three times the magnitude of the next lowest decline.95 Thus although it appears Zimbabwe had 
a moderate control of conuption in 1998, shortly after this initial measure, conuption control 
collapsed. 
Indeed, as is widely know, during this period the situation in Zimbabwe changed dramatically. 
A constitutional referendum was defeated in February 2000 despite endless campaigning by the 
Mugabe government, which argued that a vote against the constitution was a vote for 
colonialism.96 The proposed constitution would have provided presidential immunity for any 
civil or criminal charges while in office and provided the framework for forcible seizure of white 
d f . h . 97 owne arms WIt out any remuneratIOn. 
Shortly after the defeat of the constitutional referendum, squatters and alleged war veterans-
who supposedly fought in the bush war for independence in 1980-forcibly seized hundreds of 
white own farms. On 6 April 2000 the Zimbabwean parliament passed an amendment to the 
constitution allowing "confiscation of farms without compensation" to the farmers. Shortly after 
the amendment passed, President Robert Mugabe expressed his support for the over 900 farms 
already taken, extolling those responsible for forcible appropriation and commending them for 
keeping the "liberation spirit" alive.98 This also threw tens of thousands of black farm laborers 
out of work, and created a massive flight of foreign capital out of the country. 
While the political and economic catastrophe in Zimbabwe deserves much more attention than 
the confines of this analysis allow, it is clear that the unique circumstances and drastic changes 
make it difficult for initial democracy measures in 1998 to predict changes over the subsequent 
six-year period. Thus we will repeatedly see that Zimbabwe is an outlier, and I will only discuss 
the rapid statistical changes in lieu of iterating these contextual factors. 
To return to the larger point, initial control of conuption and change in basic needs satisfaction 
are weakly related. Narrowing the focus to low wealth countries exhibits a weak relationship 
between initial conuption control and change in basic needs satisfaction, but strengthens when 
explaining the outlying position of Zimbabwe, which experienced rapid and atypical political 
change. Thus, initial control of conuption is most related to change in basic needs satisfaction in 
low wealth countries that have not experienced rapid degradations in conuption control. 
b. Political and Civil Freedoms and Equality 
Does the extent of civil and political rights affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I 
attempt to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer 
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Liberties and Political Rights' for the initial measures of rights and liberties. This test of 
hypothesis (I) shows that rights and freedoms, as measured in 1998, correlate strongly with 
changes in BNS over the next six years. 
Initial freedom of the press correlates quite strongly (r = 0.69) with changes in basic needs 
satisfaction (Figure 29). The correlation remains equally strong when considering low wealth 
countries (r = 0.70) (Appendix Rand S). The vertical lines represent the distinctions between 
freedom as described by Freedom House; countries below 40 are considered not free, scores of 
40 to 69 are partly free and 70 and above is free. 
Figure 29 






























R Sq Linear = 0.479 
60.00 
Freedom of Press 1998 
B swana 
80.00 
Source: Freedom House and Afrobarometer 
The main outliers from this potentially very strong relationship are Zimbabwe, Botswana and 
Namibia. As high wealth countries, Namibia and Botswana do not seem to fit the trend shared 
by low wealth countries in their relationship between initial press freedom and changes in BNS. 
Zimbabwe does not fit the trend shared by other low wealth countries, but this is most likely due 
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While Zimbabwe's press was on the verge of free and partly free, changes have taken place since 
then to quash free press. Press freedom dropped 28 points from 1998 to 2004, more than double 
any other decrease within the group.99 The rapid change seems to negate any predictive value an 
initial measure of press freedom had for change in basic needs satisfaction. 
Thus, initial freedom of press and subsequent changes in BNS are positively correlated, 
especially in low wealth countries that have not experienced a recent collapse of press freedom. 
Initial political rights and civil liberties are also strongly correlated (r = 0.68) with changes in 
basic needs satisfaction (Figure 30). Among low wealth countries the relationship is slightly 
stronger (r = 0.76) (Appendix Rand S). Vertical lines in the graph represent distinctions of not 
free (0-1.5), partly free (2-4) and free (4.5_6).100 
I Figure 30 
































R Sq Linear = 0.446 
Political and Civil Freedoms 1998 
6.00 
L... ___________________ Source: Freedom House and Afrobarometer 
The overall relationship of initial political and civil freedoms and change in BNS is strong and 
strengthens when omitting high wealth countries, such as Botswana and Namibia. This suggests 
that where citizens enjoy political rights and civil liberties, they are more likely to see greater 
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It is also important to note that press freedoms, political rights and civil liberties all share some 
basic trends in their relationship with basic needs satisfaction. Initial levels of all types of 
freedom are important in influencing future changes in basic needs satisfaction. The more 
freedom citizens of a country have, the more likely their basic needs satisfaction will increase. 
c. Participation 
Does the extent of participation affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt to 
empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey 
data for change in basic needs satisfaction and IFES Election Guide voter turnout compared to 
registered voters. This test of hypothesis (1) shows that participation, as measured in 1998, 
correlates strongly with changes in BNS over the next six years. 
Initial participation is correlated (r = 0.52) with subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction 
(Figure 31). However, the link is far stronger among low wealth countries (r= 0.81) (Appendix 
Rand S). The major outlier is Namibia, which exceeded expected changes in basic needs 
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d. Competition 
Does the extent of competition affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt to 
empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey 
data for change in basic needs satisfaction and Polity IV 'Political Competition' to represent 
competition. This test of hypothesis (I) shows that competition, as measured in 1998, correlates 
strongly with changes in BNS over the next six years. 
Initial 'Political Competition' correlates very strongly with changes in basic needs satisfaction (r 
::: 0.71) (Figure 32).101 Strikingly, the relationship is almost perfect among low wealth countries 
(r :::: 0.99). Separating the low from high wealth countries suggests that at low levels of wealth, 
the relationship between political competition and changes in basic needs satisfaction is not 
affected by wealth. The countries deviating furthest from the overall trend are the high wealth 
countries of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. 
Figure 32 
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The visual depiction of the relationship presents questions about the 'Political Competition' 
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scores in 1998 but had very different ensuing changes in BNS. Although this could possibly 
signify that political competition is not a good indicator of changes in BNS, it seems more likely 
that 'Political Competition' makes more of a difference among poorer countries than in relatively 
wealthy ones. This may be due to the fact that wealthier countries have more developed civil 
societies that can contribute to fuller policy debate in the absence of effective partisan 
opposition. 
It is also important to note that a score of ten is the maximum score for 'Political Competition,' 
after which a country cannot improve its score. There is no distinction between a country that 
recently achieved a nine and one that achieved the rating years ago and has continued to 
improve. For example, of the four countries with scores of nine, Botswana most recently 
achieved the score in 1997; Malawi and South Africa have been rated a nine since 1994; and 
Namibia's score of nine dates back to 1990. 102 The duration a country has been a nine seems to 
partially explain the variance at the top of the scale-the longer a country has been a nine the 
more likely it is to change basic needs satisfaction for the better. 
While, these four countries may not be as politically competitive, by other definitions, as other 
countries around the world,103 they are rated as equally competitive by the Polity IV scale. This 
is possible because the Polity IV scale measures 'Political Competition' on two dimensions: "(1) 
the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition and (2) the extent of 
government restriction on political competition." This structural and regulatory approach 
measures de jure political competition more so than de facto. 
Other measures of competition might be necessary to distinguish between countries that have 
high levels of institutionalized political competition. Such measures might include the extent to 
which policies are adequately represented by political parties, and thus present viable options for 
voters. In sum, changes in basic needs satisfaction correlate with initial 'Political Competition' 
at low and improving levels, but the scale fails to distinguish between countries with high levels 
of 'Political Competition.' 
e. Accountability 
Does the extent of accountability affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt 
to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey 
data for change in basic needs satisfaction, Governance Matters lV's 'Voice and Accountability' 
for vertical accountability and Polity lV's 'Executive Recruitment and Constraints' for horizontal 
accountability. This test of hypothesis (1) shows that vertical accountability, as measured in 
1998, correlates strongly with changes in BNS over the next six years, but horizontal 
accountability has a weaker correlation with changes in BNS. 
The data shows that initial 'Voice and Accountability' correlates with changes in basic needs 
satisfaction (r = 0.69) (Figure 33). And that it also strengthens considerably among low wealth 
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Figure 33 
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Voice and Accountability 1998 
'-------------------------------- Source: World Bank and Afrobarometer 
Zimbabwe, again, lies outside the apparent relationship between initial voice and accountability 
and change in basic needs satisfaction. Although hypothesis (1) does not systematically consider 
the change in 'Voice and Accountability,' it is relevant to note that Zimbabwe's score feU by 
0.24 between 1998 and 2000 and continued to fall to -1.48 in 2004. This decrease of 0.75 over 
six years was three times the magnitude of the next largest decrease. 104 Thus, Zimbabwe's 
drastic degradation of 'Voice and Accountability' immediately following the initial measurement 
accounts for its outlying position. 
'Voice and Accountability' is important for subsequent changes in BNS, especially in low wealth 
countries. Zimbabwe seems to deviate from this common relationship, but this is explained by 
the rapid degradation of accountability within Zimbabwe since the initial measurement. Thus, 
initial voice and accountability affects changes in basic needs satisfaction, especially in low 
wealth countries, except in the case of rapid political decay. 
Initial 'Executive Recruitment' correlates modestly with change in basic needs satisfaction (r = 
0.54) (Figure 34), though strengthening somewhat among low wealth countries (r = 0.64) 
(Appendix Rand S). 105 Namibia and Botswana do not fit the trend but are high wealth countries. 
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Figure 34 
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Source: Polity IV and Afrobarometer 
Zambia is particularly low on this measure of democracy, compared to its ratings on other 
dimensions. Zambia's 1998 'Executive Recruitment' score of three began in 1996 when then 
President Frederick Chiluba made constitutional amendments intended to prohibited former 
President Kuanda and other opponents from participating in the 1996 election. 106 This measure 
may have overreacted to the actual situation in the country, since Kuanda was not a legitimate 
contender for the office. Indeed, in 200 1 supporters of President Chiluba failed in their attempt 
to circumvent constitutional restrictions of two terms per president. 107 In the absence of Chiluba 
in the presidential election, eleven parties contested the election and Levy Mwanawasa won by a 
mere two percent-29 percent over 27 percent. 108 
Zambia's jump from a score of three in 2000 to seven in 200 I could have been a result of a real 
increase in competitiveness in executive recruitment. Alternatively, the drastic numerical change 
may allude to a misjudgment of Zambia that was corrected quickly when actual events convinced 
experts of underlying competitiveness. In addition to Zambia only Ghana changed over the six 
year period and by a mere two points. 109 The unique circumstances in Zambia, meriting rapid 
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Initial 'Executive Constraints' correlate relatively weakly (r = 0.41) with changes in basic needs 
satisfaction (Figure 35) but the correlation becomes extremely strong among low wealth 
countries (r = 0.92) (Appendix Rand S).IIO Namibia and Botswana-high wealth countries-
deviate most greatly from the trend set by other countries. 'Executive Constraints' appear to 
have an effect on change in BNS, especially in low wealth countries. 






~ -I/) :;:: 






























R Sq Linear = 0.165 
Source: Polity IV and Afrobarometer 
Initial levels of accountability correlate with changes in basic needs satisfaction_ The World 
Bank 'Voice and Accountability' offers the most versatility in ranking capacity and enjoys a 
strong correlation with change in BNS. All measures of accountability are more strongly 
correlated among low wealth countries, especially when accounting for specific changes in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Dispersed Power Index 
As discussed in chapter three, these aspects of democracy can also be aggregated into an index of 
dispersed power. While the concept of dispersed power may not be as uni-dimensional as the 
index of basic needs satisfaction, III a single concept of dispersed power provides a useful way to 
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Overall initial 'Dispersed Power' correlates modestly (r = 0.58) with changes in basic needs 
satisfaction (Figure 36) and improves among low wealth countries (r = 0.87) (Appendix Rand 
S). Botswana and Namibia, both high wealth countries, remain the most prominent outliers in 
the overall relationship. Zimbabwe's deviation from the trend can be attributed to its drastic 
political changes explained in section (a) of hypothesis (1).112 Initial levels of democracy 
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Source: Freedom House, IFES, Polity IV, World Bank and Afrobarometer 
Wealth 
As the influence of wealth has been discussed throughout the analysis of hypothesis (I), it seems 
reasonable to briefly discuss the direct relationship between initial wealth and change in basic 
needs satisfaction. The relationship between initial levels of wealth and change in basic needs 
satisfaction is only a moderate one (r = 0.50)-(stronger only than the correlations between BNS 
and 'Control of Corruption' and 'Executive Constraints'). And when considering only low 
wealth countries, the relationship between initial wealth and change in basic needs satisfaction 
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countries initial levels of wealth are not positively linked to the change in basic needs 
satisfaction. 
Summary of Hypothesis One Results 
Hypothesis (I) asserts that a country's initial levels of democracy are positively related to 
subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction. My statistical analysis confirmed that all initial 
dimensions of democracy are indeed positively correlated with changes in basic needs 
sati sfaction. The strongest relationships existed between 'Freedom of the Press,' 'Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties,' 'Political Competition' and 'Voice and Accountability' with 
correlations of 0.69,0.67,0.71 and 0.69 respectively. Slightly weaker correlations arose 
between 'Participation' and 'Executive Recruitment' (0.52 and 0.54). 'Control of Corruption' 
and 'Executive Constraints' shared the weakest relationships with changes in basic needs 
satisfaction (0.47 and 0.41). 
And nearly all correlations between initial measurements of democracy and changes in BNS 
strengthen when considering only low wealth countries. Changes in basic needs satisfaction 
correlated with 'Political Competition' at 0.99, 'Executive Constraints' at 0.92, 'Voice and 
Accountability' at 0.86, and 'Participation' at 0.81. 'Political and Civil Freedoms' and 'Press 
Freedom' correlations with BNS increased modestly to 0.76 and 0.70, respectively. 'Executive 
Recruitment' correlates with BNS at 0.64. 'Control of Corruption' was the only dimension to 
decrease its correlation among low wealth countries (0.30). 
The strong positive correlations between the initial democracy measurements and change in 
basic needs satisfaction strongly suggest that democracy (measured as dispersed power) helps 
reduce poverty and that higher levels of democracy provide more help than lower levels. This 
empirical research supports claims that democracy can reduce poverty but suggests that the 
gratification is delayed. 
II. Hypothesis Two 
(DemocracY(final) -DemocracY(initial)) : (Basic needs satisfaction(final) - Basic needs satisfaction(initial)) 
Beyond a delayed effect of democracy on basic needs satisfaction, I wonder if democracy and 
BNS change contemporaneously. The second hypothesis asserts that citizens who live in a 
country where democracy is improving will also experience an improvement in BNS. Such a 
finding would mean that improvements in democracy would immediately reduce poverty. 
The statistical tests for hypothesis (2) consider correlations between changes in level of 
democracy and changes in basic needs satisfaction. This section discusses the tests done on each 
dimension of democracy including the dispersed power index. I control for initial levels of 
wealth (PPP GNI per capita), first statistically and then manually separating countries into low 
and high wealth. I also control for initial levels of democracy and then control for democracy 










J. Johnson 49 
Tests for hypothesis (2) produced no substantial correlations. These results do not support the 
assertion that democracy and basic needs satisfaction change together or that changes in 
democracy have an immediate effect on BNS. A listing of overall correlations is in Appendix R; 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
Does democracy, conceptualized as dispersed power, reduce poverty? I have argued that higher 
levels of democracy can indeed reduce subsequent levels of poverty. A high level democracy 
creates an environment conducive to innovation, experimentation and incremental change. I 
have systematically outlined how the initial level of democracy should lead to changes in basic 
needs satisfaction. And in order to go beyond mere correlation, I arranged a longitudinal design 
that established time order, and I controlled for the confounding impact of wealth. 
My research covers a six-year period of time and ten countries on one continent. The use of 
measures that can be replicated allows for future tests of similar hypotheses over various times 
and spaces. The systematic nature of the research provides transparency and reliability creating 
the possibility for generalizing results. Consequently, this study produces avenues for further 
academic research and provides grounds for certain policy recommendations. 
Theoretical Foundation 
In order to address the issue of poverty reduction, I reframed the dependent variable as basic 
needs satisfaction (BNS). This new concept provided a positive construct, instead of the absence 
of poverty. Using Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs to specify physiological human needs 
of food, water and healthcare, the Afrobarometer survey data provides a measurement of basic 
needs satisfaction. 
To conceptualize democracy, I created a construct called dispersed power. The ideas underlying 
dispersed power-limited, separated and shared power-were derived from James Madison and 
the Federalist Papers. To analyze the complex system of democracy, I extracted dimensions of 
democracy from Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino's work: rule of law, political and civil 
freedoms and equality, participation, competition and accountability. I 13 I used data and widely 
accepted indicators from Freedom House, IFES, Polity IV and the World Bank to measure these 
dimensions of democracy. 
I used indicators of democracy that describe disperse power. The 'Control of Corruption' 
indicator from the World Bank measures respect for rule of law and the possible subsequent 
limitation on power. The Freedom House indicators of 'Freedom of the Press, Civil Liberties 
and Political Rights' can represent sharing of power within society. Participation, calculated 
from IFES data as a ratio election turnout to registered voters, can exhibit further shared power 
within society. Polity IV s 'Political Competition' can provide a useful judge of the separation of 
power between different interests in government. Finally, Polity IV measures of accountability 
can provide insight into the limitations within government and World Bank measures can allude 
to the separation of power between government and citizens. 
Democracy reduces poverty, or improves basic needs satisfaction, due to its unique capacity to 
foster innovation, experimentation and incremental change. First, a democratic society with 
dispersed power provides an environment conducive to advancing new ideas because individuals 
are rewarded for their creativity. Second, democratic societies can experiment with different 
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free-flow of ideas and preempting negative repercussions of bad ideas enables countries to 
develop policies and practices that are best suited to their specific situations; this allows 
incremental change. When in a democratic society, incremental change will meet the needs of 
the people, which begin with basic physiological needs. 
Methodological Fortitude 
I developed a cross-national, longitudinal research design including ten African countries from 
1998 to 2004. This sample size enabled tests for correlation, in order to demonstrate covariance 
between dimensions of democracy and basic needs satisfaction. The time span allowed the study 
to demonstrate time order, although data availability unfortunately limited the time period. 
Finally, accounting for potentially confounding impact of wealth provided additional credence 
for claims of causation instead of mere correlation. 1 14 
Empirical Findings 
Tests of hypothesis (1) revealed that initial measurements of democracy are indeed positively 
related to subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction, especially at low levels of wealth. This 
is important because it empirically demonstrates that poor countries do not need to become 
wealthy to reduce poverty; these countries can more effectively meet the basic needs of citizens 
by improving their level of democracy. Once at higher levels of democracy, basic needs 
satisfaction will begin to increase accordingly. 
The positive correlations between democracy and change in basic needs satisfaction are 
consistent with Halperin et aI.' s theory of a democracy advantage and the underlying reasons for 
such an advantage. My concept of dispersed power addresses Halperin et aI.' s conjecture that 
innovation, experimentation and incremental change are the driving force behind the democracy 
advantage. The dimensions of democracy, measured as dispersed power, all correlate relatively 
strongly with subsequent change in basic needs satisfaction. Freedoms, political competition and 
vertical accountability enjoyed the strongest relationships while control of corruption had the 
weakest. Nonetheless, the dimensions of democracy can be combined into an index of disperse 
power. This index should not supplant the multidimensional analysis but rather provide 
empirical proof that the dimensions of democracy are related under the umbrella of dispersed 
power. 
Initial measures of wealth do not predict changes in basic needs satisfaction as well as initial 
levels of democracy. Moreover, the correlation between initial levels of democracy and 
subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction are not due to the fact that more democratic 
countries are wealthier. In fact, the correlation between dispersed power and changes in BNS 
strengthen considerably amongst poor countries. 
Tests for correlations regarding hypothesis (2) revealed that the effects of democracy are not 
instantaneous. Changes in democracy are not immediately accompanied by contemporaneous 
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This may be due to the fact that some measures of democracy remained relatively static during 
the period of time in question. Specifically, the Polity IV measures hardly fluctuated, probably 
because they measure structural conditions. Freedom house scales also changed little change 
dUling this period. This lack of fluidity may have inhibited the possibility that democracy and 
BNS would fluctuate together. 
Alternatively, the results of hypotheses (2) may suggest that there is a time delay in the effect of 
democracy on poverty reduction. From any given point, the benefits of democracy for 
development are not instantaneous but delayed by at least several years. 
Future Research 
This analysis is systematic and transparent, making it replicable and reliable. By using widely 
accepted indicators, other researchers can conduct studies using different countries and time 
periods. But there are some basic limitations that can be improved upon to enhance further 
research. 
The major limitation is data for basic needs satisfaction. This study utilized the greatest number 
of countries available over the longest period of time using Afrobarometer data. A more 
comprehensive study using Afrobarometer would be possible in the future, when more years are 
available and for more countries. Alternatively, other studies could use different indicators to 
describe basic needs satisfaction. Possibilities for sources include Latinobarometro,115 New 
Europe Barometer116 or Asian Barometer. 117 
Future studies could also go beyond the widely accepted indicators used here and attempt to 
create more conceptually valid indicators. In fact, the process of creating or improving the 
validity of one indicator could be an entire research project. Many broad studies will suffice to 
match concepts with available indicators, while a few should focus on improving the indicators 
used to measure democracy. 
The authors of the various chapters in Assessing the Quality of Democracy edited by Diamond 
and Morlino, give suggestions on how to better empirically measure the concepts of rule of law, 
civil and political freedoms and equality and accountability.ll8 Although Diamond and Morlino 
include participation and competition in the dimensions of democracy, they do not include a 
chapter dedicated to either one. I will briefly mention how each of these indicators could be 
improved. 
The current participation indicator only considers the ratio of voter turnout to registered voters in 
an election. Considering the ratio of registered voters to voter aged population may allow some 
further understanding of electoral participation. But while this would improve the measure, it 
would only gauge political participation at one point in time. A more valid measure of 
palticipation would include ongoing civil and political participation measures, such as 
involvement in political parties or social organizations. ll9 
The chosen measure of competition is a reliable measure from Polity IV, but it seems to reach a 
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indicator only considers the extent to which a candidate theoretically could lose or win an 
election, based on the structures in place. A better measure of competition would capture the 
actual likelihood that a political candidate could lose an election based on actual election results. 
Implications and Recommendations 
This analysis builds on earlier work from The Democracy Advantage, published in 2005 by 
Morton Halperin and his colleagues. In their book Halperin et al. make the case that "democracy 
does a better job raising living standards in poor countries than does authoritarian 
government.,,120 After empirically justifying their claims that higher democratic qualityl21 does 
indeed raise the quality of social welfare,122 Halperin et al. provide policy suggestions. Having 
authenticated their argument using multiple dimensions of democracy in the context of ten 
African countries, I will reexamine Halperin et al.' s recommendations. 123 
Changing the view of Change 
The overarching implication of this research suggests that relying on democracy is better than 
"relying on enlightened autocrats" to systematically promote development. 124 Rather than 
hoping that benign dictators and their policy advisors, armed with advanced degrees in 
development economics, will emerge to improve developing countries, donor countries should 
support democracies, especially those democracies that more evenly disperse power, information 
and responsibility. This dispersed power of democracies enables a process of innovation, 
experimentation and incremental change. 
To adopt a mindset conducive to development through dispersed power, we must begin by 
realizing that, although the West has achieved a high degree of wealth, it does not already have 
all the answers for development. There is no uni versally applicable laundry list of prescriptions. 
When we realize we still have much to learn, we begin to appreciate the need for innovation and 
experimentation. 
Adopting a notion of incremental change has multifaceted implications for our approach to 
development. First, such change cannot and will not take place immediately-it is gradual. This 
means that lasting differences are unlikely to take place within the span of a political term. 
Secondly, to be lasting, appropriate and effective, change must be internally driven and guided. 
This means that external assistance must be applied according to internal priorities. Finally, 
change is intentional. Merely hoping that poverty will diminish and economies will develop is 
not enough; we must make a conscious effort to enact change. 
Amending Foreign Aid Distribution 
The view that democracy is advantageous for poverty reduction and development has multiple 
implications for foreign aid distribution. Most prominently, "Preferential support for 
development assistance and debt relief should be provided to democracies ... Resources will be 
more effectively used and [give] a clear incentive for political reform.,,125 Since there is only a 
finite amount of aid available, it should be channeled towards democratic countries 126 where the 
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In light of the above argument for incremental change, and it nearly goes without saying, aid 
distributors should familiarize themselves with the aid recipients prior to allocation. Donors 
should continue to work alongside recipients, making achievable and measurable goals that do 
not simply evaluate macroeconomic development but also assess democratic progress and social 
welfare. To fund a greater variety of programs, aid distributors should expand aid channels 
beyond national government to provincial, private sector and nongovernmental organizations. 
Diversifying funding recipients will begin to disperse power. Furthering the formation of an 
independent judiciary and police force will enhance the rule of law. Funding journalists, 
publicists and activists will advance civil and political freedoms. Donating to budding civil 
society groups will boost participation. Encouraging the separation of party and state 
financing 127 will burgeon competition. Strengthening the legislature and ensuring an 
independent civil service will further augment accountability. These are only a few examples of 
the contributions to dispersed power that will eventually contribute to poverty reduction. 
A Concluding Note 
This paper makes the case that democracy can reduce poverty. The exigency for such a 
discourse derives from the discrepancy of the causal direction of the relationship between 
democracy and development. Building on theoretical underpinnings introduced by Amartya Sen 
and the empirical demonstration by Morton Halperin et al. in The Democracy Advantage, this 
paper argues that the dispersed power within democracy contributes to the satisfaction of 
citizens' basic physiological needs. This conjecture is systematically and empirically tested over 
a six-year period using ten developing countries in Africa. 
The data reveals that higher levels of democracy correspond to subsequent increases in basic 
needs satisfaction-reductions in poverty--especially at low levels of wealth. These findings 
confirm Halperin et aI.' s assertion that democracy holds an advantage over authoritarianism by 
improving social welfare in developing countries. Furthermore, the results of this study detail 
how dispersing power within government and between government and society allows for 
development through innovation, experimentation and incremental change. These conclusions 
offer great promise for foreign aid distributors because they suggest democracy and economic 
development need not be viewed as competing priorities in developing countries. Democracy 
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6. Appendix 
AB·NdSfff Id b · aSlc ee S a IS ac IOn n ex ,y per centage (Afrobarometer) 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Botswana 86.8 82.7 77.3 
Ghana 81.5 64.6 81.2 
Lesotho 37.2 24.5 41.3 
Malawi 40.6 27.6 45.6 
Namibia 26.9 70.2 55.3 
Nigeria 65.6 41.0 44.6 
South Africa 63.2 90.4 82.0 
Uganda NA 42.7 45.9 
Zambia 16.9 33.2 17.6 
Zimbabwe 31.2 23.1 9.2 
B 'N · ever G one W·th tF d' b I 00 00 y perce ntage (Afrobarometer) 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Botswana 50.7 48.5 52 
Ghana 67.2 59.8 64.2 
Lesotho 27.6 20.2 43.8 
Malawi 43.5 16.8 28.5 
Namibia 28.3 57.2 46.9 
Nigeria 58.7 54.9 42.2 
South Africa 48 62.7 59.7 
Uganda NA 47.2 43.4 
Zambia 25.5 22.9 28.1 
Zimbabwe 34.5 18.5 18.5 
C 'N · ever G one W·th t W t 'b I 00 a er Jy perce ntage (Afrobarometer) 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Botswana 70.8 68.3 63 
Ghana 60.7 57.6 62.7 
Lesotho 41.9 49.3 44.7 
Malawi 47.5 52.3 53.1 
Namibia 44.8 61.3 49.1 
Nigeria 40.4 35.3 42.5 
South Africa 62.6 72.7 65.1 
Uganda NA 49.5 49.4 
Zambia 38.1 53.4 28.5 
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D. 'Never Gone Without Healthcare' by percentage (Afrobarometer) 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Botswana 68.7 70.8 61.8 
Ghana 53.3 45.2 56 
Lesotho 48.9 20.6 29.4 
Malawi 27.6 24.5 42.7 
Namibia 25.4 51.8 45.5 
Nigeria 63.9 40.1 39.8 
South Africa 41.3 66 59.2 
Uganda NA 29.2 32 
Zambia 20.3 27.5 24.3 
Zimbabwe 28.4 19.5 12.6 
E Ch . ·B·NdSfff b t ge (Afrobarometer) anges III aSlc ee S a IS ac IOn .y percen a 
Food Water Healthcare Total 
Botswana 1.3 -7.8 -6.9 -9.5 
Ghana -3 2 2.7 -0.4 
Lesotho 16.2 2.8 -19.5 4.1 
Malawi -15 5.6 15.1 5.C 
Namibia 18.6 4.3 20.1 28.4 
Nigeria -16.5 2.1 -24.1 -21.C 
South Africa 11.7 2.5 17.9 18.7 
!Zambia 2.6 -9.6 4 0.7 
!Zimbabwe -1 E -8.8 -15.8 -22.0 
F C t I fC . on ro 0 I f f orrupl IOn, sca e rom-2 t 2 (World Bank) 0 
1998 2000 2002 2004 
Botswana 0.53 1.02 0.8 0.86 
Ghana -0.44 -0.34 -0.39 -0.17 
Lesotho 0.03 0.32 -0.18 -0.05 
Malawi -0.5 -0.21 -0.85 -0.83 
Namibia 0.24 1.13 0.16 0.18 
Nigeria -1.01 -1.06 -1.32 -1 .11 
South Africa 0.42 0.57 0.35 0.48 
Uganda -0.62 -0.86 -0.92 -0.71 
Zambia -0.56 -0.82 -0.91 -0.74 
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G. Freedom of the Press*, seale from 1 to 100 (Freedom House) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Botswana 70 70 72 73 70 70 70 
Ghana 40 39 39 45 73 70 72 
Lesotho 42 41 44 48 54 58 60 
Malawi 60 58 48 48 46 43 48 
Namibia 70 62 66 66 66 63 66 
Nigeria 7 45 47 45 43 47 47 
South Africa 72 72 75 77 77 75 76 
Uganda 60 60 60 60 58 55 56 
Zambia 40 38 38 38 35 37 37 
Zimbabwe 39 36 33 31 17 12 11 
* Freedom House scores are 100 to 1 with 1 being a completely free press. These scores are 
reversed so that a score of 100 is a completely free press. 
H P rr I R" hts* . o I lea Igi I f ,sea e rom It 7(F d 0 ree om H ouse ) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Botswana 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Ghana 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
Lesotho 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 
Malawi 5 4 4 3 3 4 3 
Namibia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Nigeria 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
South Africa 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Uganda 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 
~ambia 2 2 2 2 3 3 :: 
!Zimbabwe 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
* Freedom House scores are 7 to 1 with 1 being maximum political rights. These scores are 
reversed so that a score of 7 is the highest degree of political rights. 
I. Civil Liberties*, seale from 1 to 7 (Freedom House) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Botswana 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Ghana 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 
Lesotho 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Malawi 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 
Namibia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Nigeria 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 
South Africa 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Uganda 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Zambia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Zimbabwe 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
* Freedom House scores are 7 to 1 with 1 being maximum civil liberties. These scores are 
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J R f fV t t R . t d V . aJOo o es 0 egis ere oters b t y percen age (IFES) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Botswana 77.1 76.2 
Ghana 60 85 
Lesotho 71.8 66.7 
Malawi 93.8 47.6 
Namibia 62.8 84.9 
Nigeria 52.2 69 
South Africa 89.3 76.7 
Uganda 70.3 
Zambia 67.8 
Zimbabwe 48.3 47.7 
tPresldential elections were used where available; Parliamentary elections were used In the 
absence of presidential elections. 
K. Political Competition, scale from 1 to 10 (PolilY IV) 
1998 2000 2002 2004 
Botswana 9 9 9 9 
Ghana 8 8 8 9 
Lesotho NA NA 7 7 
Malawi 9 9 8 8 
Namibia 9 9 9 9 
Niaeria NA 5 5 5 
South Africa 9 9 9 9 
Uganda 2 2 2 2 
Zambia 7 7 7 7 
Zimbabwe 2 3 2 2 
LV· . OIce an dA bT I f ecounta I Ity, sea e rom-2 t 2 (World Bank) 0 
1998 2000 2002 2004 
Botswana 0.77 0.78 0.73 0.73 
Ghana -0.53 0 0.01 0.39 
Lesotho -0.01 -0.03 -0.16 0.28 
Malawi -0.1 -0.28 -0.56 -0.5 
Namibia 0.42 0.28 0.33 0.47 
Nigeria -1.48 -0.68 -0.7 -0.65 
South Africa 0.87 1.05 0.73 0.86 
Uganda -0.61 -0.94 -0.77 -0.64 
Zambia -0.11 -0.24 -0.4 -0.36 
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M. Executive Recruitment, scale from 1 to 8 (Polity IV) 
1998 2000 2002 2004 
Botswana 8 8 8 8 
Ghana 5 5 7 8 
Lesotho NA NA 8 8 
Malawi 7 7 7 7 
Namibia 7 7 7 7 
Nigeria NA 7 7 7 
South Africa 8 8 8 8 
Uganda 5 5 5 5 
Zambia 3 3 7 7 
Zimbabwe 3 3 3 3 
N. Executive Constraints, scale from 1 to 7 (Polity IV) 
1998 2000 2002 2004 
Botswana 7 7 7 7 
Ghana 4 4 6 6 
Lesotho NA NA 7 7 
Malawi 5 5 4 6 
Namibia 5 5 5 5 
Nigeria NA 5 5 5 
South Africa 7 7 7 7 
Uganda 3 3 3 3 
Zambia 5 5 5 5 
Zimbabwe 3 3 2 2 
O. Dispersed Power Index, scale from -2 to 2 
199B 2004 
Botswana 1.15567 1.04129 
Ghana -0.45397 0.81855 
Lesotho NA 0.48292 
Malawi 0.3829E -0.36154 
Namibia 0.53859 0.6035E 
Nigeria NA -0.4731 9 
South Africa 1.34451 1.11432 
Uganda -0.811 :: -0.83635 
Zambia -0.73872 -0.32949 
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P G . ross Nfl I a IOna "t PPP ncome per capl a, t" t f I d II ,curren merna IOna oars (W rid Bank) 0 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Botswana 6,270 6,610 7,190 7,700 8,190 8,900 9,590 
Ghana 1,710 1,770 1,840 1,920 1,990 2,090 2,220 
Lesotho 2,580 2,590 2,660 2,800 2,940 3,090 3,270 
Malawi 560 570 570 550 560 590 630 
Namibia 5,790 5,910 6,120 6,300 6,720 6,990 7,520 
Nigeria 760 760 790 820 820 910 970 
South Africa 8,800 8,920 9,260 9,570 9,970 10,340 11,160 
Uganda 1,100 1,170 1,220 1,270 1,330 1,360 1,430 
Zambia 700 710 740 780 800 840 900 
Zimbabwe 2,680 2,590 2,410 2,390 2,300 2,090 2,040 
R C . I f orre a Ions 0 fB " N d S f f f aSlc ee s a IS ac Ion an dD emocracy, usmg P ears on's'r' 
Dependent Variable Changes in Basic Needs Satisfaction 
Independent Variable Initial Democracy Changes in Democracy. 
Controls ~ealth wealth dem ~ealth, dem 
Control of Corruption 






Voice and Accountability 
Executive Recruitment 
Executive Constraints 
Dispersed Power Index 
Thtrd' Variable 
Ippp GNI per capita 













?b 2c ~d 
0.34 0.27 0.25 0.21 
-0.1 0.29 0.43 0.46 
0.07 0.28 0.23 0.23 
0 0.29 0.39 0.39 
0.22 0.24 0.15 0.17 
-0.07 0.03 O.E 0.1': 
-0.09 -0.15 -0.02 -0.06 
-0.01 0.32 0.31 0.33 
-0.11 0.17 0.33 0.36 
0.21 0.42 0.25 0.39 
0.13 0.22 0.27 0.27 
0.421 0.6§ 
S C " I f orre a IOns 0 fBNS d D an emocrac' in Low Wealth Countries, using Pearson's 'r' 
Hypothesis 
Control of Corruption 
Freedom of Press 
Pol and Civ Freedom 
Participation 
Political Com~tition 
Voice and Accountability 
Executive Recruitment 
Executive Constraints 
Dispersed Power Index 
Third' Variable 
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